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Abstract: 
Since the 1960s, most professional sports facilities have been financed through a mix of private 
and public funds. Team owners contribute private capital to the project, but the majority of the 
funding comes from the taxpayer. These public dollars are drawn from the supplementation of 
existing taxes, or the creation of new taxes in the cities or surrounding counties where the sports 
franchise operates, and are usually subject to a public vote. In most cases, local citizens do not 
support the use of taxpayer dollars to fund professional sports stadium subsidies. Previous 
research demonstrates that the local politicians and corporate executives who benefit from 
hosting a professional sports franchise can influence voter opinion by reframing the tax increases 
as a means to remain a “major league city,” and by claiming that the economic value of the 
project will exceed its costs. In this paper, I argue that local political and corporate elites employ 
their respective strengths and influence to create a positive frame of stadium subsidies for 
professional sports franchises and thus generate voter support for these subsidies. I examine the 
legislative processes that provided public funding for the football and baseball stadiums built in 
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati in the late 1990s. I then use these two cities as a basis for comparison 
to modern cases in Arlington, San Diego, and Las Vegas, three cities that are currently 
negotiating financing terms on new professional sports stadiums. Finally, I consider the modern 
cases to evaluate any new trends that may have developed in the recent decades. The stadium 
deals of the 1990s involved a large percentage of public funding and in some instances created 
disastrous economic effects for the cities and counties that approved the funding. The subsequent 
financial fallout for the local government and taxpayers can be used to inform contemporary 
voters about the potentially negative impact these subsidies can have on county and city 
governments, as our present decade is exhibiting a similar “stadium boom” push. This paper 
aims to show the effects that corporate and political elites can have on reframing sports stadium 
subsidies as positives so as to influence the passage of the tax increases that provide the public 
funds. 
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Section I: 
Introduction: 
The economics of sports leagues cause its member teams to move or spring up in cities 
where the market appears most financially viable. By constantly chasing successful or strong 
markets to sustain league revenue growth, professional sports leagues create demand for new 
stadiums in new cities. City and local governments often bear some of the cost and use taxpayer 
dollars to fund stadium development, in an effort to prevent existing teams from leaving or for 
the purposes of attracting new teams. In 1995, the Quebec City Nordiques relocated to Colorado, 
leaving the city of Quebec without a professional sports team and the Colisée de Quebec without 
a National Hockey League tenant for the first time in twenty-three years (Fortin, 2015). During 
its sixty-eight year existence, the arena had hosted teams in Canadian and American hockey 
leagues alike, with the Quebec Remparts of the Quebec Major Junior Hockey League (QMJHL) 
and the Nordiques of the National Hockey League (NHL) constituting the arena’s main 
occupants until the Nordiques departure in 1995.  
Desperately wanting to attract another NHL team to play in Quebec City, the local 
politicians proposed construction of a new hockey arena in 2009 that would draw its funding 
from city, province and federal governmental sources. Quebec City Mayor Regis Labeaume and 
the Premier of Quebec Jean Charest announced to the public their intention to fund a new 
stadium and bring an NHL team back to the province’s capital. Their initial stadium-funding 
plan included no financial contribution from private citizens or corporations, relying solely on 
the taxpayer to cover the cost of a new stadium with no indication that the city would receive an 
NHL team to offset the public cost. After falling to garner federal funding support for the new 
stadium, Labeaume tripled Quebec City’s commitment to the project to $187 million, and 
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borrowed $125 million over a twenty-five year period to cover the city’s contribution (Gagnon, 
2011). The province of Quebec provided $200 million dollars in funding, as Charest argued that 
the province’s capital city “should have modern facilities” (Gagnon, 2010). The combined $387 
million in taxpayer dollars from the city and province were approved without a public vote, 
despite a poll that showed that fifty-five percent of respondents in Canada opposed the use of 
public funds for professional facilities (Star, 2011 B). A dissenting majority of citizens had no 
say in the allocation of the hundreds of millions of their taxpayer dollars, as stadium-seeking 
politicians controlled the city and province’s purse strings.  
A new funding source emerged for the proposed Quebec City stadium in the form of the 
CEO of Canadian media giant Quebecor. Karl Peladeau publicly offered to commit “tens of 
millions of dollars” to the stadium, and eventually struck a deal with the city to purchase naming 
and management rights to the proposed stadium, with the financial terms conditioned on the city 
being able to attract a new NHL team (Star, 2011 A). To be sure, none of Peladeau or 
Quebecor’s funding was used to construct the new arena, but rather to offset its costs after 
completion (Ibid.). Like most media companies that are involved in stadium financing deals, 
Quebecor stood to benefit from the existence of a new professional team in its region – Quebecor 
could use the content created by the team to create value for their company through broadcasting 
and distribution rights. The political-corporate alliance of Labeaume, Charest and Peladeau 
sought to use public dollars to construct a new stadium in Quebec City, with the private funding 
commitment to the project increasing if the city received an NHL team, and only after 
construction had been completed. The actions of three powerful figures in Quebec bypassed 
public opinion and ensured that the proposed $400 million stadium would be built completely 
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with public funds. The Videotron Centre broke ground in 2012 and was eventually finished by 
2015 and its management rights were sold to Peladeau for $33 million (Zeisberger, 2015).  
The construction of the Videotron Centre in Quebec City becomes even more 
problematic given the uncertainty of the city attracting an NHL team to play in the new and 
expensive arena. The politicians and Peladeau made their funding commitments to the Videotron 
Centre with the knowledge that there would be no immediate NHL tenant. Gary Bettman, the 
commissioner of the NHL, gave no clear indication to the city that it would receive a team 
through relocation or expansion, but noted that the only way that the city could receive a team 
was through the construction of a new stadium (Gagnon, 2010). Bettman’s non-committal stance 
made the Videotron Centre a potentially disastrous public expenditure. In 2014, the NHL 
publicly announced that it hoped to find teams for Quebec City, Seattle, Toronto and Las Vegas 
in time for the 2017 NHL season (Gagnon, 2014). The NHL not only coerced Quebec City to 
fund a new arena, but also placed it in open competition with three large cities. After a two-
month process, the NHL granted Las Vegas, not Quebec City, an expansion team in 2016 
because the league considered the city to be “the entertainment capital of the world” that could 
help enhance the reputation of the league (Traikos, 2016). The NHL gave preference to a city 
with a larger economic pull and a largely tourist population over a smaller city with a proven 
NHL background and a rich culture of hockey fandom. 
In the absence of an NHL team, the Videotron Centre continues to host smaller events 
and the Quebec Remparts. It is the largest stadium in the QMJHL, and represents both a failed 
public expenditure and excessive willingness by politicians and corporate actors to chase 
professional sports teams against the wishes of the public. Four months after it opened, the 
Videotron Centre had already run up a $1.4 million debt. The agreement between Peladeau and 
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the Quebec City government required that the city and province pay at least half of any 
operational deficits incurred by the facility, despite Peladeau and Quebecor maintaining 
management rights to the stadium (Valiante, 2016). The expensive stadium did not attract an 
NHL team and charged the taxpayer with its debts even though voters had no say in the approval 
of public funds for the project.  
Though the Canadian and American political structures differ in multiple respects, the 
two systems appear to be in agreement that the public must provide a subsidy to help 
professional franchises construct new facilities. Not all stadium financing cases involve non-
electoral allocation of taxpayer funds like Quebec City – rather, public financing of professional 
sports stadiums is often decided through a means of direct democracy: the ballot referendum. 
Citizen voters are called upon to make informed choices and vote their preference on ballot 
referendums. If many of these publicly funded stadium plans are approved through direct 
democracy, and voters generally oppose using taxpayer funds for these projects, how do they 
pass? Local political and corporate elites and the actors who will benefit the most from the 
construction of a new professional sports facility employ their strengths to ensure that stadium 
expenditure ballot measures pass.  
These actors are able to influence voter preference through control over the means by 
which information about the ballot measure is passed to voters, and by framing the potential 
public expenditure in positive terms. Direct democratic measures such as ballot referenda lack 
traditional cues that help voters simplify their choices. As such, local politicians use their public 
influence to argue that the presence of a professional sports team is necessary for the reputation 
of the city or region, and that stadium subsidies can persuade professional sports teams to remain 
in the region. Similarly, local corporate executives use their reputation in the local economy to 
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argue that professional sports teams and stadiums create economic value for the surrounding 
areas, and that the public will benefit the most from stadium construction if they are the principal 
financiers. In this paper I will argue that the politicians and corporate executives who support 
public financing plans for professional sports stadiums can influence public opinion to favor 
such expenditures by dominating the information channels and framing the projects in favorable 
terms. The public stances of these actors serve as a cue for how citizens should vote on ballot 
measures that approve public financing for professional stadiums. The uninformed citizens are 
captive to the desire of powerful local actors and end up approving ballot referenda.   
 Multi-million dollar professional sports franchises and their billionaire owners take 
advantage of taxpayers by demanding public financing for new stadiums. Professional sports 
stadiums are expensive and often exceed their original budgets due to an underestimation of the 
necessary costs required to complete them. As sports facilities are generally poor financial 
investments, team owners look to local governments for funding sources and are able to demand 
them through the leverage afforded the teams by the economic growth of professional sports. 
The increase in the number of viable cities for a professional franchise allows owners to pit 
competing cities against one another, and hold out for the cities that can offer the highest public 
contribution toward a new stadium. To that end, they threaten to uproot and relocate their 
franchises, irrespective of long-standing traditions or ties to the communities in which the teams 
operate. Though citizens do not wish to see their hometown teams leave the community, they 
tend to oppose professional stadium subsidies and consider them to be a form of corporate 
welfare to the already wealthy franchise owners (Delaney and Eckstein, 2007).  
Local corporate elites and politicians aim to capitalize on the public’s desire to keep their 
beloved professional sports franchises in town. They attempt to sway public opinion to favor the 
 10 
use of taxpayer dollars for stadium building by framing the expenditure as necessary to remain 
an elite city, in impossibly favorable economic terms, and by assuring the public that the 
recipient franchise owners will contribute a substantial amount of private funds to the project. 
Moreover, the partnership of these elite actors comes in the form of highly organized pro-
stadium tax campaigns that are aimed at convincing the voters to favor professional stadium 
subsidies. The coordinated support for stadium subsidies by local corporate executives and 
politicians serves as a powerful framing tool that is geared toward eroding voter opposition to 
public financing of professional stadiums through the employment of their combined strengths 
and reputations within the community. The spending power of corporate elites and the public 
influence of local and state politicians dominate the information campaigns to approve public 
funds for stadium construction through a referendum vote. 
Elite dominance over direct democratic processes is problematic because it defeats the 
purpose of citizen voting. A population that does not support subsidies for professional sports 
franchises should be able to turn their collective opinion into public action through referenda 
votes. Local governments approve large public contributions to professional sports stadiums 
against the wishes of their constituents. Political and corporate elites employ their respective 
strengths to finance large information campaigns that reframe stadium subsidies as both 
necessary and potentially beneficial to the city. To chart the progression of elite dominance over 
stadium tax referenda measures, I will examine two stadium financing referenda votes in the late 
1990s in Pittsburgh and Cincinnati and evaluate the effect that local politicians, corporate 
executives, and professional team owners had on reframing the subsidies as positives and passing 
the necessary taxes to finance stadium construction. I draw my information of these tax votes 
from the largest circulated newspapers in both cities, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and Cincinnati 
 11 
Post, respectively. I will then use my findings from the Pittsburgh and Cincinnati cases to 
compare how elite strategy has changed in pro-stadium-tax campaigns since the late 1990s and 
examine three contemporary stadium-financing cases in Arlington, Texas, San Diego, California, 
and Las Vegas, Nevada using the same method. I argue that political and non-team owner 
corporate elite influence matters in stadium tax referenda votes, and that pro-tax politicians have 
developed new taxing schema to increase public support for professional stadium subsidies in 
these modern cases. 
 
Related Literature on Professional Sports Stadium Construction: 
Contemporary instances of private financing for professional sports stadiums are few and 
far between. Economists Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist note that prior to 1960, many 
professional sports stadiums were privately owned and financed by the teams that played in them 
(Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). Typically, two franchises shared the same multi-use stadiums and 
each team would combine to contribute the majority of funding – the Pittsburgh Steelers and 
Pirates shared Three Rivers Stadium, and the Cincinnati Bengals and Reds both played in 
Riverfront Stadium. As stadiums have become substantially more expensive – Three Rivers 
Stadium cost $55 million to complete, while the combined cost of new stadiums for the Pirates 
and Steelers cost nearly $497 million – teams and corporations have become less likely to 
contribute large sums to the stadium development projects (Barnes, 1997). Noll and Zimbalist 
argue that because the revenue from the new stadium is unlikely to exceed the interest and 
amortization costs incurred during construction, teams and private corporations do not bear the 
costs of construction because facilities are “not financially viable” for a private company (Noll 
and Zimbalist, 1997). The increase in construction costs for professional sports stadiums hoists 
 12 
the majority of financial burden on to the taxpayer and away from the actors that will gain from 
the facilities.   
The growing trend in professional sports stadium construction involves at least some 
portion of the stadium being shouldered by taxpayer dollars. Economist Zachary Phelps reports 
that of the thirty stadiums constructed between 1953 and 1973, twenty-seven received $450 
million in taxpayer support (Phelps, 2004). The phasing out of multi-use stadiums also 
contributes to a shift away from private financing, as individual franchises begin to demand their 
own facilities and no longer pool together private funds with other teams. Noll finds that thirty-
one new stadiums were built between 1987 and 1997, with an additional thirty-nine franchises 
advocating for new facilities (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). This “stadium boom” is self-
perpetuating, as it affords team owners the opportunity to claim that they need new facilities in 
order to compete financially with rival franchises that have recently received new facilities 
(Brown and Paul, 2002). As the construction of single-team stadiums continues to grow, the use 
of some amount of public funds has essentially become the formula adopted by local 
governments to keep their professional franchises from relocating.  
The trend toward larger public contribution to stadium projects is problematic, however, 
as professional sports stadiums tend to create more economic burdens than rewards. Professional 
sports stadiums are generally a poor investment because they often experience cost over-runs. 
Economist Bent Flyvbjerg defines the estimated costs of a public construction project as those 
that are determined “at the time of the decision to build” and that the conservative nature of these 
costs reflects the infancy of the project (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002). The initial cost 
approximations of public works projects tend to be the amount that voters decide on because 
voter approval ensures the project continues as planned. Noll states that the “actual magnitude” 
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of the government subsidies allotted for such projects tends to be “greater than the estimate due 
to errors in estimating the costs and revenues” of the stadiums, as governments are often 
responsible for paying these over-runs (Noll and Zimbalist 1997).  
As a result of these over-runs, voters are unwittingly agreeing to pay significantly more 
than the initial figure when they approve stadium subsidies for professional teams. Large public 
development projects often experience such significant cost over-runs. Flyvbjerg furthers this 
argument by stating that cost estimations for public projects happen “successively” after the 
project has been approved and that the initial cost estimation is “far from final” (Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, and Buhl, 2002). As the costs of professional sports stadiums are often underestimated 
and the public is increasingly responsible for paying a portion of them, the economic burden is 
shifted from private firms to taxpaying citizens. Such miscalculations can be devastating for 
counties in smaller markets; Cincinnati’s Paul Brown Stadium has cost Hamilton County $454 
million, $170 million higher than its original estimate (Preston, 2016). Voters have agency in 
determining whether public funds will be used for stadium construction, and can avoid such 
financial disasters by voting them down. 
Ballot referendums are the main form of political participation to approve the use of 
public funds for professional sports stadiums. Local politicians such as County Commissioners 
or state legislators propose increases to existing taxes or the creation of a new tax to provide 
funds for professional stadiums through a referendum. The referendum process was created to 
give citizens a more active role in American democracy and the policy-making process. First 
implemented during the Progressive era, referendum votes were designed to give citizens agency 
in deciding local governmental expenditure decisions and take legislative power away from a 
minority of powerful actors. Proponents of direct democracy contended that having citizens vote 
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on individual pieces of legislation through referendums would create a more politically informed 
and active electorate (Smith, 2002). Political scientists Clyde Brown and David Paul estimate 
that referendums regarding tax increases draw a large voter turnout of roughly 40%, and that 
many such elections set local voter turnout records “for primary, secondary, or nonpresidential 
elections” (Brown and Paul, 2002). Citizens exhibit higher rates of turnout on referendums when 
tax increases are on ballot because of the local financial implications of these ballot measures 
and their increased political role through direct democracy.  
Though ballot referendums on tax increases garner relatively large voter turnout, their 
inherent nature as nonpartisan issues complicates voter behavior. The increase in voter 
participation for ballot referendums hides the overall ignorance of the American voter to general 
policy issues. In The American Voter, social psychologist Angus Campbell argues that few 
voters are actually aware of “major policy issues” and their implications (Campbell et al., 1960). 
The American voter is largely uninformed about the political process and the legislation that it 
produces. Political scientists Eric Smith and Peverill Squire consider partisan labels to be the 
most significant cue that affects American voter behavior in elections (Smith and Squire, 1988). 
Voters look to politicians and political party platforms to determine how they should evaluate a 
given ballot issue. 
Political scientist David Magleby furthers the notion that voters use their political party’s 
position to “simplify” the voting process, but contends that voters are unable to do so as ballot 
referenda and initiatives are bereft of these “party cues” (Magleby, 1995). Even though ballot 
referenda and initiatives are non-partisan issues that cannot be tied to the agenda of a specific 
political party, the positions of local politicians on such issues can have significance for voters. 
Magleby finds that citizens are more favorable of referendum measures that are placed on the 
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ballot by the state legislature than they are of citizen-sponsored initiatives (Ibid.). Prospective 
voters exhibit more support for politician-sponsored referenda than citizen-sponsored initiatives 
because of their willingness to follow the opinions of their elected officials. Though direct 
democracy was created to give the public a more active role in politics and take away political 
control from the powerful few, citizens are more likely to ally with politicians than the public 
because of their reliance on politicians and political parties to determine their vote choices.  
The inherent lack of information of direct democratic elections leaves uneducated voters 
vulnerable to the interest of powerful actors. In addition to providing citizens with signals on 
how they should vote on a given issue, political parties and politicians coordinate information 
campaigns during the election process to build support for their cause. Yet, as direct democratic 
processes lack traditional partisan cues and are not overtly supported by either party, voters are 
without a major institutional source of education for ballot propositions. The lack of political 
voting cues for ballot measure thus favors any group that can control the flow of information and 
best disseminate it to the electorate. Political scientists Caroline Tolbert, Daniel Bowen and Todd 
Donovan argue that campaign spending in ballot initiative campaigns gives voters a level of 
information through “mass media advertising” (Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan 2009).  
The main medium by which voters receive information of a ballot measure is through 
advertising campaigns that are coordinated by politicians but funded by non-political groups. 
Political scientists Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan argue that the campaigns that spend the 
most on information dissemination do so not to alter public opinion on the issue but rather to just 
create “awareness” of the ballot issue, which then allows the voter to evaluate the measure in 
“partisan or ideological terms” (Bowler and Donovan, 2000). Large spending campaigns are not 
geared to convince the public to support the ballot proposition, but rather to give the voter their 
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own tools to consider the proposal – which in turn favors the group that can spend the most. The 
link between large spending campaigns and referendum success is troublesome because it defeats 
the purpose of direct democracy – the interests of the rich few that can finance these spending 
campaigns tend dominate over the uninformed public.  
The nature of ballot referendums that increase taxes to provide professional sports 
franchises a stadium subsidy is problematic given public opinion on government expenditure in 
general. Voters rarely exhibit strong support for any taxing and spending measures implemented 
by their respective governments. Economist Sam Peltzman concludes that voters “penalize” state 
and federal governments that increase their spending budget by refusing to vote for those same 
candidates in later races (Peltzman, 1992). Voters express their dislike for growing state 
expenditures by rescinding their support for those who actively increased budget spending, and 
thus punish these politicians only after the expenditure has been made. In stadium construction 
cases, voters can voice their disapproval of state spending in two ways: public opinion polls and 
citizen initiatives that are aimed at preventing public spending for sports stadiums. Paul and 
Brown highlight a 1995 national survey in which eighty percent of those polled disagreed with 
the use of taxpayer funding to finance professional stadium construction (Paul and Brown, 
2006). An overwhelming majority of American citizens disapprove of subsidies for professional 
stadiums.  
If a large portion of the American population is against public subsidies for professional 
sports stadiums, how do these ballot propositions pass in referendum elections? Paul and Brown 
note that citizens will sponsor ballot initiatives against public financing; over fifty thousand 
Denver citizens signed a petition to prevent public spending on sports stadiums (Brown and Paul, 
2002). These types of initiatives tend to fail, however, as evidenced by the proliferation of 
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stadium subsidies since 1960 and the subsequent “stadium boom” of the 1990s. Although voters 
often voice their negative opinions on the efficacy of stadium subsidies, they rarely seem to 
achieve their stated goal of defeating the taxes at the polls. Paul and Brown state that stadium 
tax-backers won in “56 percent” of the instances in which a majority of citizens polled “initially 
opposed” public financing for such projects (Paul and Brown, 2006). The willingness of voters to 
favor politician-backed referendums that support public financing over citizen-backed initiatives 
that malign the public financing of stadiums ensures that taxpayer dollars are contributed to a 
majority of stadium construction cases. The reliance on referendum voters to follow political 
opinion on issues of ballot propositions gives pro-tax politicians the opportunity to build more 
public support for unpopular stadium subsidies.  
Political elites support the use of public funds for stadium construction because of the 
intangible benefits that come with having a sports franchise. Local politicians frame stadium-
subsidy ballot referendums as necessary for capturing the consumption value that professional 
teams create, and less about the overall economic effects of the proposed stadium. The use of 
issue framing for tax increases by politicians can influence the passage of ballot referendums. 
Paul and Brown find that the local political elites frame such referendums in terms of the 
“potential loss of the cherished professional sports franchise” (Brown and Paul, 2002). The issue 
is then evaluated from a sentimental as opposed to an economic perspective.  
The presence of a professional sports team allows politicians to label their city as first-
rate among others and to create a sense of pride among its constituents, which unites its citizens 
under a common interest and rooting identity. Economist Jerry Owen remarks that having a 
professional team can “instill pride” in the surrounding area, even for those who are not fans of 
the team (Owen, 2003). After signing a deal to have the New England Patriots relocate to 
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Hartford in 1998, Connecticut Governor John Rowland dubbed the purported move as an 
opportunity for those in the city of Hartford “to redefine ourselves,” and claimed that a 
professional sports team “creates a lot of pride” (Swift and Keating, 1998). Though the Patriots 
ended up reneging on their agreement with Hartford, Rowland was able to justify the potential 
expenditure to the public as necessary to maintaining the city’s reputation and pride. Pro-tax 
politicians support the use of public funds to build sports stadiums because of the non-economic 
value and prestige that professional sports teams create.  
Local corporate executives and pro-tax supporters spend more on advertising to 
disseminate information that overtly supports stadium-financing referendums because there tends 
to be strong opposition against using public funds for this purpose. The few that stand to benefit 
from the construction of professional sports stadiums overwhelmingly favor stadium referenda 
ballot measures. Local corporate elites and organized interests are often proponents for the public 
financing of professional sports facilities. Economist Mark Rosentraub finds that by framing the 
tax used to generate public funds for a professional stadium as a “large-scale economic 
development project,” corporate leaders in “local real estate, financial and media firms” support 
the referendums in droves (Sandy, Sloane, and Rosentraub, 2003). These business leaders then in 
turn attempt to influence the passage of referendums for “development projects” because they 
stand to benefit the most from them. Moreover, economist Rodney Fort states that the economic 
benefits created from stadium construction are concentrated among a small group of actors, 
namely “the team, the press…the industries that will build the stadium” and that such interests 
“have a very large individual stake in getting a stadium improved” (Fort, 1997). Corporate 
executives and businesses are principal stakeholders in stadium tax referenda campaigns because 
they reap the concentrated economic benefits from stadium construction. 
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These wealthy private actors justify their support of stadium subsidies by publishing 
economic studies that assert the stadium will benefit all citizens. Local corporate elites pay 
economic consulting firms to publish favorable economic studies about the proposed stadium. 
Noll concludes that these actors publish “bogus” economic impact studies that exaggerate the 
stadium’s potential economic benefit by tens of millions (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). Businesses 
and corporations are not the only private stakeholders in publicly financed stadium construction. 
The power of local media elites to influence ballot referendum outcomes can be seen in the case 
of Minneapolis in 1978. It is in the best interest of the media to support the use of public 
financing for stadiums because the teams create the content that those media outlets broadcast. 
Corporate and media elites favor ballot referendums that promote the use of public funds for 
stadiums because they benefit financially from the continued presence of the sports franchises, 
and publish misleading economic studies to convince the electorate that it is in their best interest 
to approve these subsidies. Though the voters did not support a public subsidy for a new stadium 
for the Twins, the city’s two largest newspapers, the Minneapolis Star and the Minneapolis 
Tribune exhibited broad support for the initiative, and publicly financed construction began in 
the winter of 1979 (Quirk, 1997).  
Team owners are chief among the corporate elites that benefit from the use of public 
funding for sports stadiums. Professional sports stadiums tend to have a mix of public and 
private funding, with the beneficiary franchise usually contributing at least some amount of 
funding to the project. Team owners use their prospective contribution of funding to the stadium 
construction projects as a means of making these subsidies more palatable to voters. Law 
professor Martin Greenberg claims that of the 20 professional stadiums constructed during the 
1990s, $2.1 billion of the $5.3 billion spent on stadium construction came from the beneficiary 
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sports franchises (Greenberg, 1999). In an effort to get a new stadium, Denver Broncos owner 
Pat Bowlen agreed to contribute at least $50 million as a stipulation of the tax, and ended up 
contributing up to $100 million of private funds towards a new stadium (Lowe, 1998). Team 
owners give private funds to publicly financed sports stadiums because they use them the most 
and gain from them financially by not having to assume a larger portion of the costs.  
The means by which owners contribute private funding, however, is problematic in that it 
is essentially a transfer of private income from one group of consumers to the owner. Phelps 
observes that personal seating licenses (PSLs) are sold to provide private funds for the project. A 
PSL is a fee that fans pay for “the right to a seat” in the stadium, and generally has no value 
beyond reserving a fan’s season ticket seat for one year (Phelps, 2004). To offset the Steelers’ 
contribution to Heinz Field, team owner Dan Rooney sold $26.5 million in PSLs to fans of the 
franchise (PPG Editorial, 1998). Owners are essentially transferring private citizen income on 
these economically value-less PSLs to the construction of their new stadiums. Corporate elites 
such as franchise owners mislabel the intent of stadium subsidies as necessary for local economic 
development and use private citizen dollars in the form of PSLs to make the stadium subsidies 
more acceptable to voters.  
A gap in the research on the efficacy and use of public funds to pay for professional 
sports stadiums is that it has largely ignored the role that a corporate-political elite coalition can 
play. Most researchers either focus on the influence of corporate elites and the relocation 
leverage that professional franchises owners possess, or the influence that elected officials may 
have in a referendum vote, whether in opposition or in support. In their paper on the effects of 
elite endorsements on stadium financing referendums, Paul and Brown state that most scholars 
who conduct research on the subject, including themselves, lack a complete understanding of 
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“the factors and circumstances that determine whether these referendums are approved or 
rejected by voters” (Paul and Brown, 2006). The two authors’ paper represents the closest 
attempt in the literature to explain the effects that both corporate and political elites have on 
public opinion on this issue, but their analysis focuses solely on the effects of either the support 
or opposition of these powerful groups, not on the coordination between them. Moreover, studies 
such as these do not consider professional sports franchise owners to be among the corporate 
elites that can influence the passage of referendums. The employment of the combined strengths 
of the two sets of powerful actors is often enough to convince voters to approve stadium tax 
referenda.   
Local corporate actors ally with political elites to create pro-tax campaigns that raise and 
spend money to distribute information that frames professional sports stadium subsidies in a 
favorable context. Political and corporate elites gain significantly from using public funds for 
stadium construction so as to convince local professional franchises to remain in town. Fort notes 
that this collaboration is natural as the proponents of publicly financed stadiums have “higher 
personal stakes” which lead them to take a “more active role” in ensuring the passage of a ballot 
referendum (Fort, 1997). This active role prompts large corporate actors to contribute to pro-tax 
campaigns: Denver Broncos owner Pat Bowlen contributed $650,000 to the pro-stadium tax 
campaign, which helped to create a 32:1 spending ratio between the pro-tax and anti-tax 
campaigns (Lowe, 1998). Moreover, Brown and Paul find that there is more public support for 
referendums that have been sponsored by elected public officials than citizen-sponsored 
initiatives (Brown and Paul, 2002). The alliance of financial and political power operates to 
overwhelmingly dictate the outcome of votes to approve public funding for stadiums. 
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The widespread use of public funds for professional sports stadiums supports the notion 
that pro-tax campaigns succeed and create voter awareness of the perceived benefits of publicly 
financed stadiums. The professionalization of pro-tax campaigns through the coordinated efforts 
of corporate and political elites gives them a distinct advantage over unorganized anti-tax groups. 
Noll describes most pro-tax campaigns as “well organized with clearly defined money interests” 
and anti-tax campaigns as “poorly organized, poorly funded” and less likely to win even if they 
have public support (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). Rich and powerful local actors support public 
financing for sports stadiums, while local citizens and non-political figures oppose stadium 
subsidies. In a forty-team study, Brown and Paul claim that pro-tax campaigns raised and spent 
an average of $1.4 million, as compared with $78,300 by anti-tax campaigns, with media 
spending disparities ranging from 2:1 to 309:1 in favor of the pro-tax groups (Brown and Paul, 
2002). The combination of corporate funding with political organization makes pro-tax 
campaigns difficult to beat. Brown and Paul further argue that ballot referendums favor well-
organized groups that try to increase government activity and not “less well-organized citizen-
taxpayers” that disapprove of government activity in stadium construction (Ibid.).  
Pro-tax campaigns leverage their strong organizational makeup and fundraising 
capabilities to control the flow of ballot proposition information and influence voter preferences 
regarding subsidies for professional sports stadiums. The median voter preference among 
citizens tends to be in opposition of public financing for professional sports stadiums. In most 
cases, voters favor the construction of new stadiums for their professional sports franchises, but 
advocate against the use of public funding for these projects. Noll’s research indicates that while 
eighty percent of those polled in Minneapolis favored some form of a new stadium for the 
Minnesota Twins, eighty-two percent of citizens outright opposed the use of public funds for the 
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project in 1978 (Quirk, 1997). As mentioned earlier, the media outlets in Minnesota played a role 
in the campaign for the use of public funds to prevent the Twins from leaving (Ibid.). Similarly, 
in 1997, many citizens feared the Broncos would relocate for a new stadium, but fifty-six percent 
of those polled in Denver and its surrounding counties opposed the use of public funds for the 
potential construction project. The pro-tax campaign in Denver outspent the opposition $1.4 
million-$13,000, and received public support from several “volunteer politicians,” while the anti-
tax campaign was largely ineffective and disorganized (Lowe, 1998). The combined strengths of 
corporate and political elites overwhelm uncoordinated anti-tax coalitions. 
The legislative process by which local governments approve funding sources for 
professional sports stadiums runs counter to its intended goals. Progressive reformers in the early 
twentieth century pushed for referendum voting to create more instances of direct citizen 
participation in the legislative process. The political reality of direct democracy, however, 
demonstrates that broad public opinion on a ballot proposition is less influential than the actions 
of a powerful minority. Ballot proposition votes and other forms of direct democracy lack 
traditional partisan voting cues and political party-sanctioned information campaigns to educate 
voters on the issues that the vote will decide.  
As such, referendum voters must look elsewhere for information about the vote to make 
reasoned choices. Local political elites leverage their power and influence as elected officials to 
convince citizens of the need to contribute stadium subsidies for professional sports teams to 
remain respectable cities. Politician support of stadium tax plans can influence voter behavior on 
ballot propositions because referendums and direct democratic processes lack traditional voter 
cues. By local political elites, I am referring to politicians such as Mayors, City Council 
members or County Commissioners in the areas that will be affected by the passage of the 
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referendum. As ballot propositions are derived from citizens and politicians alike and are 
generally single-issue votes, they often lack cues for the common voter. Campbell finds that 
“party identification” serves as a strong indicator for voters because it allows them to understand 
the issue in partisan terms, and thus gives voters a shortcut to vote on ideological terms 
(Campbell, 1960).  
In their book on voter opinion, Bowler and Donovan claim that support from elites or 
reference groups can operate as a “shortcut” for undecided voters in direct democracy elections 
(Bowler and Donovan, 2000). Brown and Paul corroborate this notion by arguing that ballot 
referendums lack traditional partisan electoral cues because local party organizations are not very 
involved in referendum votes (Paul and Brown, 2006). Moreover, the authors highlight the 
“familiarity” that citizens feel to their elected officials, and that this familiarity makes them more 
likely to use the endorsements of their local politicians as signals on how to vote (Ibid.). Voters 
will align their preferences on ballot referenda with those of their elected officials because of the 
emotional and ideological connection they feel towards with them. Local politicians who support 
public financing of sports stadiums use their public influence and position as a cue-giver to 
convince voters to approve stadium subsidies for teams. As such, the presence of regional 
political elite support increases the likelihood of adopting stadium funding plans that involve the 
use of some public funds. 
Corporations that favor public development of professional stadiums similarly capitalize 
on voter ignorance to ballot measures. Corporate executives contribute large sums of funding to 
pro-tax campaigns and thus improve the electoral chances of stadium subsidies by funding 
information campaigns that frame the tax in favorable economic terms. Ballot initiatives and 
referenda were designed to lessen the influence of large interests in the American policy process. 
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Progressive-era politicians lobbied for ballot referenda in order to “counter narrow interests” by 
giving citizens a means to bypass a corrupt state legislature (Bowler and Donovan, 2000). Yet 
corporate interests remain a factor in ballot referenda because of their ability to financially 
support one side of the campaign. Bowler and Donovan highlight that voter knowledge of ballot 
referenda is limited (Bowler and Donovan 1994), and Magleby categorizes the American public 
as having an “idealized” notion that voters educate themselves about referendum votes 
(Magleby, 1995).  
Citizens that exhibit a lower level of knowledge about the ballot referendum can be 
swayed more easily. Paul and Brown argue that local media coverage, “both paid and free” 
operates as the main method by which pro and anti-tax organizations interact with voters on 
ballot propositions (Brown and Paul, 1999). As such, the campaign that can raise and spend the 
most to distribute advertising and information to voters has the advantage. Bowler and Donovan 
equate a high financial capacity of a referenda campaign to having control of the information 
given to the public about the vote (Bowler and Donovan, 2000). Political scientist Graham 
Ramsden takes a narrower view by stating that the media are the “only source of campaign 
information” to the referendum voter (Ramsden, 1996). Corporate executives are better equipped 
to control of the main source of information about the referendum to the voter because of their 
immense financial capabilities to execute mass media buys. Local corporate executives frame 
stadium subsidies as necessary development projects that will create economic value and jobs for 
the city and surrounding counties, and are able to spend large sums of money on media 
campaigns that distribute favorable information of the proposed subsidies. Local corporate chief 
executives can influence the passage of public financing plans by giving large monetary 
 26 
contributions to the pro-tax campaigns. Whichever tax campaign receives monetary support from 
corporate executives should have more success at the ballot box.  
Professional sports team owners promote these tax campaigns by offering to contribute 
millions of dollars to offset the potential cost of the stadiums, and thus ease the impending and 
inevitable financial burden that a professional stadium will have on the public. Private funding 
contributions by team owners towards stadium construction projects positively influence public 
support for subsidies for sports stadiums. Owners shoulder more of the financial burden of multi-
hundred million-stadium projects by contributing large sums of private money towards 
professional sports stadium construction. Prior to the 1960, professional sports stadiums were 
funded almost entirely by private actors (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). In his data set on the public-
private financing split of stadiums built in the 1990s, Greenberg finds that the mean percentage 
of public funds used for stadium construction were roughly 60%, with several cases exceeding 
this mean total1 (Greenberg, 1999). As the trend in public-private financing mix of sports 
stadiums skews further towards the taxpayer covering the majority of the construction costs, 
team owners have little incentive to commit funds to the stadium construction projects.  
Team owner financial support toward stadium construction is an explicit indication to 
referendum voters that the franchise and its ownership group are satisfied with the public’s share 
of the costs and will not relocate. This satisfaction can be used to build public support for the 
measure by demonstrating that the owner has a stake in the project. Political scientist Monika 
McDermott argues that those groups and individuals that publicly oppose or support the measure 
determine the voting cues for the typical citizen on the given referenda (McDermott, 1997). Like 
the local political and corporate elites, team owner financial support of the stadium construction 
project is a cue to voters that their beloved franchises are willing to remain in the region, should 
                                                        
1 Stadiums for the Indiana Pacers and Bengals were funded with 100% of public funds 
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the tax pass its referendum vote. Monetary commitments by professional team owners can 
increase the likelihood that citizens will approve the use public funds for stadium construction. 
By indicating their preference that the stadium tax is passed, owners can increase the electoral 
chances of stadium taxes by publicly campaigning in favor of the tax. 
The increase in professional sports stadium construction since the 1960’s has prompted 
different approaches by local governments and created financing-plan trends that one can study 
to better understand the impact of public financing for privately owned sports franchises. Cities 
with differing population totals, demographics and mix of corporate entities will devise different 
taxing structures or bond issue structures to pay for stadium subsidies, and these plans can vary 
by the decade. Fort utilizes a table that charts twenty-nine public votes on stadium subsidies, 
twelve of which succeeded, that span from 1974-1996. The table demonstrates that all twenty-
nine cases involved financing plans that tax local citizens in the areas that would receive new 
stadiums. The citizens who voted on stadium referenda up through 1996 were for the most part 
deciding whether or not to tax themselves to keep their professional sports team. It is thus 
interesting to examine why so many of these cases succeeded, with voters agreeing, knowingly 
or not, to shoulder a portion of the construction costs. Moreover, of Fort’s twenty-nine self-
selected stadium case votes, sales and excise tax increases had the most electoral success among 
voters (Fort, 1997). Tax increases on individual goods like tobacco and cigarettes create similar 
voter approval as stadium financing measures, as do sales taxes that are diffused over all citizens. 
Zimmerman offers an explanation for concentrating stadium subsidy costs on those that live in 
the surrounding areas because the “beneficiaries” of having a professional sports team generally 
live in the area where the team plays (Zimmerman, 1999).  
 28 
 Yet the public and the surrounding population are rarely the chief beneficiaries in 
professional sports stadium development projects. Fort contends that as average citizens have 
little at stake in the matter of ballot measures, that the “extremely high per capita stakes” of 
corporate actors that benefit from the presence of a professional sports franchise will dominate 
ballot referendums and secure subsidies for the teams (Fort, 1997). The perpetual corporate 
influence on direct democratic measures regarding publicly funded professional stadiums is 
worthy of study as it allows one to understand the changing landscape of corporate elite 
involvement in development projects of this type. Another trend that ought to be examined is 
which type of corporate interest will provide the most support for a stadium ballot measure in the 
form of financial contributions towards pro-tax campaigns. As previously mentioned, the media 
outlets in Minneapolis played a large role in the passing of a stadium subsidy in 1978 despite 
tremendous public disapproval for stadium subsidies in the city (Quirk 1997). Media outlets are 
large stakeholders in the desire to attract or keep professional sports franchises nearby, as they 
work in quasi-coordination with the professional team to purchase the requisite broadcasting 
rights for the content and distribute it to the local population. Charting the supporters of stadium 
subsidies over-time can indicate which contemporary industries benefit the most from the 
presence of teams, and whether they can sustain their financial support of such projects.  
The principal stakeholders in the stadium development game often are those that force 
the issue to the forefront for citizen voters. Team owners create the electoral impetus to approve 
stadium subsidies by threatening to relocate from their city unless they receive a new stadium to 
help them compete financially. As previously stated, Phelps’ “stadium boom” of the 1980s and 
1990s created more stadiums and demand among team owners for new stadiums because their 
rivals had recently received new stadiums (Phelps, 2004). Franchise owners often constitute the 
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majority of the private funding source that is used to build the stadiums that they demand from 
the local government. Of the nineteen teams in Greenberg’s table on the private-public funding 
split on stadiums constructed before 2000, only two were financed completely by the local 
government, and only one was financed entirely by private contribution (Greenberg, 1999). 
Ownership groups contribute funding to their own professional stadium construction projects to 
signal to the voters that they will remain in the region for the right price. Team owner role in 
professional stadium subsidies can influence the amount of public funds that local politicians 
will commit to such projects. Greenberg notes that after the New England Patriots were unable to 
come to terms with Massachusetts on a new stadium in the late 1990’s, the State of Connecticut 
offered Patriots’ owner Robert Kraft a $374 million stadium entirely funded by the taxpayer and 
essentially “rent-free and tax-free” (Greenberg, 1999). Owners, especially owners of teams that 
appear willing to relocate in search of a better stadium financing deal, play an instrumental role 
in stadium subsidy referenda votes because of the interest local politicians and corporate 
executives have in retaining or attracting professional sports teams to their city. 
The combined strengths of these elite actors exert an immense impact on the passage of 
stadium tax referenda. As such, these elites organize their efforts into professional campaigns 
that favor tax increases used to pay for a portion of the construction of stadiums for professional 
franchises. Though the average American opposes the use of public funds to benefit sports 
owners, their preferences are often overridden due to their lack of funding or organization in 
oppositional campaigns. I expect that local political support will positively influence the 
electoral chances of stadium subsidy referenda because of voter ignorance and the importance of 
an electoral cue in vote-choice. I expect that large monetary contributions to pro-tax campaigns 
will increase the likelihood of stadium referenda, as it will give these campaigns the comparative 
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financial advantage to dominate advertising space. I expect that team owner financial 
contribution to stadium construction will increase the likelihood of stadium tax referenda 
because it is a public gesture of good faith to the voters that the team will not relocate and is a 
stakeholder in the stadium deal. Political and financial power serves as the bellwethers of success 
for ballot referendums. 
In the following section, I evaluate the strength of my hypotheses regarding stadium tax 
referenda votes in Pittsburgh and Cincinnati in the late 1990s. To test my claims, I use articles 
from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and Cincinnati Post that catalog the referenda votes for new 
stadiums for the baseball and football teams in Cincinnati and Pittsburgh. I predict that all of my 
variables – political elite support, corporate elite support, and team owner support for stadium 
subsidies – will be significant in the stadium tax votes, but that political elite support will have 
the most effect on the vote because of the reliance on citizens to align their vote choices with 
those of their elected officials. I will then proceed to test my initial hypotheses regarding elite 
support for stadium tax measures in three contemporary stadium financing cases, to see both if 
my own predictions remain relevant to the study today and whether any new trends have 
emerged in contemporary stadium financing plans 
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Section II: 
 
Hypotheses: 
 
1. Political elite support: The presence of regional political elite support increases the 
likelihood of adopting stadium-funding plans that involve public funds. 
2. Corporate executive support: Local corporate chief executives can influence the passage 
of public financing plans by giving large monetary contributions to the pro-tax 
campaigns. 
3. Team owner support: Monetary commitments by professional team owners can increase 
the likelihood that citizens will approve the use public funds for stadium construction. By 
indicating their preference that the stadium tax is passed, owners can increase the 
electoral chances of stadium taxes by publicly campaigning in favor of the tax. 
 
Comparative Case Study of Pittsburgh and Cincinnati: 
 The development of the roles that local political and corporate elites play in stadium 
subsidy cases over the past forty years can prompt scholars to speculate why certain stadium 
referenda votes passed and others failed. In order to evaluate the reasons why a stadium tax did 
not pass, one can choose two cities of similar size and sports history that held stadium 
referendum votes during a similar time period.  I will examine the stadium referenda votes in 
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati in the late 1990’s as a means for comparison of the importance that 
each elite stakeholder (politician, corporate executive, team owner) had in the vote. Pittsburgh 
and Cincinnati are ideal as a comparative case study given their similarities as cities and the 
concurrence with which both cities approved public funding for their professional sports teams. 
Both cities have populations of roughly 300,000 and are located within the same region in the 
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United States (Census, 2016). In the late 1990s, the professional baseball and football franchises 
in both Cincinnati and Pittsburgh played in multi-use stadiums, and had done so since 1970: The 
Pittsburgh Pirates and Steelers shared Three Rivers Stadium, and the Cincinnati Reds and 
Bengals played in Riverfront Stadium.  
The trend away from multi-use stadiums to single-team stadiums and the “stadium boom” 
of the 1980s and 1990s prompted all four franchises to demand new publicly financed facilities 
of their own in order to remain financially competitive with their rivals, as both of the football 
teams and baseball teams all competed in the same league division as their respective 
counterpart. To help offset the costs of these stadiums and provide incentives to the teams to 
remain in the region, local politicians in Cincinnati proposed a half-cent sales tax increase in 
Hamilton County dubbed “Issue 1.” The tax increase would remain for an indeterminate amount 
of time, and raise $50 million annually, $35 million of which would be devoted to building new 
stadiums for the Reds and Bengals (Horstman, 1996, E). The politicians in western Pennsylvania 
drafted the “Regional Renaissance Initiative,” a half-cent sales tax increase in the eleven counties 
surrounding Allegheny and that would generate between $600-$700 million over seven years. Of 
the $700 million raised, an estimated $226-$258 million would be used for stadium construction 
for the Pirates and Steelers, and the rest would be allocated to enlarge the Convention Center and 
build roads and create industrial sites for the counties (Barnes, 1997).  
I will evaluate my hypotheses that local political support of stadium ballot measures 
increases their likelihood of passage by using the two largest circulated newspapers in Pittsburgh 
and Cincinnati, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and the Cincinnati Post, respectively, to see if the 
local politicians publicly campaigned for the tax increases, and to what degree they attempted to 
build public support for the subsidy referenda. To test my hypothesis that local corporate 
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executive financial support of pro-subsidy campaigns increases the electoral chances of stadium 
tax referenda, I will use the Post-Gazette and Post to see the funding contributions that both tax 
campaigns received prior to the vote and the subsequent expenditures that the tax campaigns 
were able to make. I test the significance of team owner financial contribution towards stadium 
development projects by using both the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and the Cincinnati Post to 
examine if the owners made any public commitment to contribute funding, and to what extent 
the ownership group publicly campaigned in favor of the stadium taxes. I will then use the main 
sources of media in cities that are currently experiencing a push for publicly financed stadium 
development, and test the validity of my claims as well as identify whether any new trends have 
emerged in the stadium development game.  
Given its shorter duration, the broader dispersion of the tax among many citizens and that 
the majority of funds were committed to public projects other than stadium building, the 
Pittsburgh Regional Renaissance Initiative appears more attractive to voters wary of public 
subsidies for professional stadiums than does Cincinnati’s Issue 1. The Regional Renaissance 
Initiative failed and Issue 1 passed because of the role of that corporate and political actors 
played in their respective campaigns. The level of corporate elite involvement in the campaigns 
and the local political approval dictated the success of the proposed taxes at the polls.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Political Elite Support 
 
The presence of regional political elite support increases the likelihood of adopting 
stadium-funding plans that involve public funds. In single-issue elections, voters are dependent 
on the opinions of their elected officials for signals on how they should vote. As the crafters of 
the Regional Renaissance Initiative were local politicians, voters in Pittsburgh and its 
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surrounding counties were immediately made aware of those who support the tax plan. Given the 
public support of the Regional Renaissance Initiative by several prominent local politicians, I 
expect that the stadium tax plan would have passed in Pennsylvania in 1997. 
Western Pennsylvanian politicians formulated the Regional Renaissance Initiative. 
Pittsburgh Mayor Thomas Murphy, and Allegheny County Commissioners Michael Dawida and 
Robert Cranmer announced the tax plan to the public and served as its strongest proponents 
(Belko, 1997). In his announcement of support for the tax plan, Commissioner Cranmer labeled 
it as creating “real development, real jobs and real growth” that those in the region “haven’t seen 
in years” (Ibid.) The familiarity of the Mayor of Pittsburgh and the support of two 
Commissioners in the Steelers’ County ought to have provided a political signal for the voters to 
favor passing the tax. Moreover, the Pittsburgh politicians who supported the Initiative also 
made economic appeals to the public to generate support for the tax. Senator Rick Santorum 
contributed federal-level support to the stadium tax plan. Like Cranmer, Santorum argued in 
favor of the prospective tax by stating that it would be “progressive and not regressive” and 
equated the economic importance of the Steelers and Pirates with that of the steel industry to the 
surrounding region (Santorum, 1997). The pro-tax politicians framed the taxes as necessary for 
the economic value of the region to convince voters of the need to prevent the teams from 
relocating. The support of three local politicians and a sitting United States Senator provided the 
voters a reliable political cue on how to vote on the Regional Renaissance Initiative.  
The majority of the local politicians, however, aligned in opposition to the proposed tax 
increase. Twenty-two out of the twenty-five of the County Commissioners from the eleven 
affected counties publicly opposed it (Staff Editorial, 1997). A former Allegheny County 
Commissioner, Larry Dunn, headed an organized anti-tax campaign. The oppositional campaign 
 35 
had the support of the Allegheny Institute for Public Policy, a newly created conservative think 
tank funded by Pittsburgh newspaper magnate Richard Mellon Scaife (Robinson, 1997). This 
widespread political and media opposition to the Initiative led the Pittsburgh-Post Gazette to 
label the politicians that supported the subsidies as a “relatively small cast” (Simonich and 
Schmitz, 1997), thus conveying to voters that more politicians opposed the measure than 
supported it.  
The nearly unanimous disapproval of the tax by twenty-two County Commissioners does 
not support my hypothesis that local political elite support, in any form, will increase the 
likelihood of using public funds for professional sports stadiums. Politician disapproval is more 
of an indicator of the potential passage or failure of a referendum. Bowler and Donovan find that 
the typical voter uses electoral cues to confirm their own beliefs in direct democratic votes like 
referenda that offer little information to the public (Bowler and Donovan 2000). The strongest 
electoral cues are ones that align with a voter’s previously held convictions. Moreover, Paul and 
Brown note that as citizens generally disapprove of tax increases, any politician-led disapproval 
of proposed tax increases can be very salient for undecided voters to vote against such measures 
(Paul and Brown, 2006). Because citizens have a tendency to be opposed to tax increases of any 
form and look to politicians for signals as to how they should vote on a given issue, political elite 
opposition to a proposed tax breeds stronger voter opposition because it acts as a cue to be 
equally dissenting of the tax measure. The majority of prospective voters used political elite 
opposition to the Regional Renaissance Initiative as a means of considering the tax increase as 
unpopular among elite stakeholders, and thus voted down the proposed stadium taxes. 
Local political elite support for the Regional Renaissance Initiative had minimal effect on 
voter support for the stadium tax because of the inconsistent views of the officials who supported 
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it. The two Allegheny County Commissioners who were supportive of the tax had previously 
forged an alliance to oust Larry Dunn from the County Commissioners’ office (Belko, October 
31 1997). By working together to halt Dunn’s political career, Commissioners Cranmer and 
Dawida created a politically savvy enemy and, in a sense, gave life and organization to the 
opposition campaign. In a public debate on the tax measure, Dunn played a campaign 
commercial of himself and Commissioner Cranmer from their 1995 County Commission 
election that depicted Cranmer saying “we don’t think you [taxpayers] should have to pay for a 
new baseball stadium. The owners of the Pirates should pay for it” (Schmitz, 1997). Dunn later 
labeled Cranmer’s policy reversal as a “shattered campaign promise” (Belko, 1997). The strong 
local political opposition to the stadium-financing tax plan, and the public undermining of the 
politicians who supported the measure all but ensured that the Regional Renaissance Initiative 
failed in 1997. 
 The Issue 1 tax increase in Cincinnati experienced much less political backlash than the 
Regional Renaissance Initiative did in Pittsburgh. Both local and state politicians publicly 
campaigned in favor of the Issue 1 sales tax increase that would finance new stadiums for the 
Reds and the Bengals. Hamilton County Commissioner Robert Bedinghaus was the first 
politician to endorse the half-cent sales tax increase in his own county based on the argument 
that the “future” of Cincinnati depended on keeping the Reds and Bengals from relocating 
(Andry, 1996). Ohio Governor George Voinovich, Cincinnati Mayor Roxanne Qualls and the 
Hamilton County Republican Party would eventually join Bedinghaus in his support of the tax 
increase, which became official during a public rally between the three politicians and several 
Cincinnati Bengals’ football players (Report, 1996). “Familiar” local politicians like County 
Commissioner Bedinghaus and Mayor Qualls and state politicians like the Governor Voinovich 
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publicly backed the sales tax increase and labeled it an integral piece of the future for the city of 
Cincinnati. The supporting politicians lent their organizational skills to the pro-tax campaign, 
and helped it pass out literature and erect nearly nine thousand pro-tax signs throughout 
Hamilton County in the lead up to the election (Andry, 1996). 
Few if any politicians, local or otherwise, exhibited disapproval of the Issue 1 sales tax 
increase. Unlike in Pittsburgh, the anti-tax campaign had no help from a former politician. The 
Cincinnati opposition campaign, Citizens for a Choice in Taxation, was headed by a local 
attorney, and struggled to match the political organization of the pro-tax campaign. The lack of 
strong funding sources or even a general organizational structure of the anti-tax campaign 
prompted the Cincinnati Post to predict that the March 19th vote on the Issue 1 tax will be 
“lopsided in favor of the tax advocates” (Horstman, 1996, A). Several African American 
politicians in Hamilton County politicians expressed concerns about the regressive nature of the 
Issue 1 tax increase. City Council member Tyron Yates opposed the sales tax increase because it 
“does not help low-income residents, particularly African Americans,” and stated that the 
African American legislators of Hamilton County had not “been consulted” about how to make 
the tax more palatable to voters (Jackson, 1996, A). African American sentiments toward the 
Issue 1 tax increase were blunted, however, when the Cincinnati chapter of the NAACP issued 
its support of the taxes a month prior to the vote. Cincinnati NAACP chapter president Milton 
Hinton justified the organization’s support for the increases because of the purported benefits 
that they would have on the Cincinnati school system and minority businesses in Hamilton 
County (Jackson, 1996, B). African American political support of the Issue 1 tax increase 
provided no clear cue for Hamilton County voters to vote down the tax increase, as its leadership 
was publicly divided on whether the tax would be beneficial to citizens (Sturmon, 1996). 
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 Broad political endorsement of the Issue 1 tax increase and minimal political opposition 
to the tax measure significantly improved its electoral chances in March of 1996. The Issue 1 
sales tax increase won by a margin of 61-39 percent, and garnered most of its support from 
suburban counties. The Cincinnati Post notes that the majority of Cincinnati’s “inner city, poor 
and minority neighborhoods” had voted against the tax increase, with thirty percent of Cincinnati 
precincts defeating the tax increases. The tax had overwhelming support from the more “affluent 
suburban” counties surrounding the city, as it was only defeated in eight percent of precincts 
outside of the city limits (Ibid.). The regressive Issue 1 sales tax increase passed in 1996 on the 
strength of wealthier voters who could afford to pay the potential tax. Lack of clear political 
opposition and the presence of overwhelming support of the Issue 1 tax increase by local and 
prominent politicians alike guaranteed the public’s share of the financing for new stadiums for 
the Bengals and Reds.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Corporate Elite Support  
 Local corporate chief executives can increase the electoral chances of stadium tax 
referenda by giving large monetary contributions to the pro-tax campaigns. Voters are generally 
less informed about referendums, and their votes are pliable to advertising and paid information 
campaigns. The organizations in support of the Regional Renaissance Initiative exhibited a 
spending and financial advantage over its opposition group. I expect that the financial advantage 
of the corporate-backed pro-tax campaign will help the Regional Renaissance Initiative pass 
because of the group’s dominance of the local media, the main information channel for 
referendum voters.   
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The political campaign that lobbied for the passage of the Regional Renaissance Initiative 
operated with a distinct fundraising dominance over the anti-tax campaign. The pro-tax 
organization raised in excess of $4 million and outspent the opposition campaign by a ratio of 
160:1 (O’ Toole, 1997, A), largely through contributions that exceeded $50,000.2 U.S. Steel, 
Pittsburgh National Corporation (PNC), Mellon Bank and the Hillman Company contributed 
$400,000 dollars each, and the Pirates and Steelers contributed $700,000 (Ibid.). One week prior 
to the November election, the pro-tax group had spent $3.9 million, with $3.1 million of the 
expenditure “earmarked for media buys and direct mail advertising” campaigns meant to educate 
voters about the benefits of the proposed stadium construction (Ibid.). The pro-tax campaign 
spent more than three-quarters of its budget on media, operated with an immense spending 
advantage over its opposition, and thus clearly controlled the advertising space for the ballot 
referendum. The complete financial advantage and media control exhibited by the pro-tax 
campaign put the group in position to see the Regional Renaissance Initiative pass its referendum 
vote.  
The large spending advantage and the pro-tax campaign’s ties to large Pittsburgh 
corporations hurt the Regional Renaissance Initiatives electoral chances. The connection of the 
pro-tax campaign to wealthy business executives made the tax increase less appealing to local 
voters. The alliance that the pro-tax campaign had with rich corporations and the franchises 
allowed the media and oppositional groups to frame the Regional Renaissance Initiative in more 
negative terms. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette labeled it a “stadium tax” after a public pep rally 
two weeks prior to the vote (Batz, 1997). In the televised debate regarding the sales tax increase, 
anti-tax campaign coordinator Larry Dunn argued that the corporate support of the tax by 
Pittsburgh banking and steel industries and the affected franchises further indicated that the 
                                                        
2 98% of the campaign’s contributions were more than $50,000 
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increase was a “stadium tax” and only meant to provide corporate welfare for the teams 
(Schmitz, 1997). The increased financial capabilities of the Pittsburgh pro-tax campaign 
generated a largely negative public opinion, leading some to malign the campaign’s efforts as 
“driven by special monied interests” (Barnes, 1997).   
Financial advantages in campaign spending for ballot referendums are not a strong 
indicator of success in a ballot referendum vote and do not support my hypothesis that stadium 
tax referendum success is tied to financial advantage. Overspending for or against a ballot 
measure prompts the voter to associate the campaign with its donors. Bowler and Donovan argue 
that whenever a large corporation commits funding to a referendum campaign, voters get a cue 
about what interests support which side (Bowler and Donovan, 2000). Law professor Daniel 
Lowenstein takes the argument further by stating that excessive public spending in a ballot 
referendum can have a negative or null effect on public opinion because of its association to the 
donors (Lowenstein, 1982). The voter views referendum campaigns with large financial 
capabilities as the corporations that create this financial advantage. Bowler and Donovan argue 
that spending in favor of propositions may actually have “a paradoxical effect” and create voter 
opposition to the proposed measures (Bowler and Donovan, 2000). Overspending on ballot 
referendum campaigns can create public opposition to the wealthier campaign because of the 
negative association that voters express toward wealthy groups and interests. 
The variety of donation sources and sizes to the Cincinnati Issue 1 pro-tax campaign 
prevented any oppositional group from giving it a negative frame. To be sure, the Cincinnati 
campaign, like Pittsburgh’s, exercised a considerable spending advantage over the anti-tax 
group. The range of different sources from which the campaign drew, however, did not readily 
align the campaign’s efforts with those of wealthy actors. Ninety percent of the donors to the 
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pro-Issue 1 group contributed $100 or less, with its largest contributor giving just $35,000. This 
large array of small contributions led the Cincinnati Post to dub the pro-tax campaign as being 
“fueled by small donors,” and that those in charge of the pro-tax campaign had “learned a 
valuable lesson” from other public campaigns that had derailed due to a reliance on large 
corporate contributions (Horstman, 1996, C). Advantages in media spending are more beneficial 
in ballot referendum votes if they are less drastic. Magleby notes that financially strong 
campaigns make a difference in these votes by “fostering more ‘no’ voting,” and that “one-sided 
spending” can increase the likelihood of referendum passage if exhibited at “lower-spending 
levels” (Magleby, 1995). The Cincinnati pro-stadium tax campaign was more successful than the 
Pittsburgh pro-stadium tax campaign because it did not grossly outspend its opposition, and 
received its contributions from a variety of donors so as to not inextricably tie them to one or a 
series of corporate actors.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Team Owner Support 
Monetary commitments by professional team owners to new stadiums can increase the 
likelihood that citizens will approve the use of public funds for stadium construction. The 
progression from privately financed stadiums before 1960 to majority-publicly funded stadiums 
in the 1990s gives team owners new opportunities to secure public funding for their prospective 
stadiums. They can leverage their public positions and financial strength to garner voter support 
for stadium taxes by offering to commit a portion of their own money towards the project. 
Though there is little academic literature quantifying the effect that team owner financial support 
has on stadium tax referenda, I expect that any team owner financial commitment to stadium 
construction and team owner public campaigning for stadium taxes will increase the likelihood 
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that public funds are approved for such projects. I anticipate that the financial commitments from 
the Pittsburgh Steelers and Pirates will help the Regional Renaissance Initiative pass, and that the 
complete lack of financial support from the Cincinnati Bengals and Reds’ ownership groups 
could hurt the electoral chances of the Issue 1 sales tax. 
The Pittsburgh Pirates and Steelers’ respective ownership groups were vocal and public 
in their support of the Regional Renaissance Initiative. As both franchises have operated in 
Pittsburgh for over eighty years, it seemed unlikely that either team would holdout for an 
excessive amount of public funds to remain in the region. Kevin McClatchy, the principal owner 
of the Pirates at the time of the vote, offered to commit $35 million in funding towards a new 
stadium, which constituted roughly fifteen percent of the baseball stadium’s proposed 
construction cost. Dan Rooney of the Steelers proposed a contribution of $50 million to their 
new stadium’s proposed construction costs, or twenty-one percent of the total costs (Robinson, 
1997). Both ownership groups operated with good faith and publicly offered to supply private 
funding towards the new stadiums.  
In order to bolster public support for the stadium tax referenda, the Steelers’ ownership 
group openly campaigned for the passage of the Regional Renaissance Initiative. Team vice-
president Art Rooney II urged supporters to pass the tax increases to prevent the Steelers from 
relocating from Pennsylvania by arguing that the team was in a financial situation that was worse 
than that of their rivals in Cleveland and Baltimore (Ibid.). Further, Rooney stated that the 
“future of the region” was at stake should the Regional Renaissance Initiative fail, and publicly 
campaigned for the initiative for the three weeks leading up to the vote (Collier, 1997). Political 
scientists David Bositis, Denise Baer, and Roy Miller examine the effects of primacy and 
recency on information presented to voters on local partisan political issues. They conclude that 
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the more recent that a group makes an appeal to voters the more impactful it is, and that message 
recency is more significant to prospective voters than is message primacy (Bositis, Baer, and 
Miller, 1985). As mentioned previously, voters rely on cues for indications on how to vote on 
issues with limited information; the side that can produce the most information to the electorate 
generally wins ballot referenda (Bowler and Donovan, 2000). The recency of Rooney’s public 
support for the Regional Renaissance in the three weeks prior to the vote should resonate with 
voters to support the measure.  
The Pittsburgh franchise owners’ public support and financial commitment to the stadium 
construction projects did not help the Regional Renaissance Initiative’s electoral chances. The 
over-commitment by both ownership groups led the local media and likely referendum voters to 
label the Regional Renaissance Initiative a “stadium tax.” As previously argued, this “stadium 
tax” frame proved both damning and relatively false – the Regional Renaissance Initiative would 
have raised $600-$700 million dollars, of which $226-$258 million dollars would go toward 
stadium construction, which only constitutes thirty-two percent of all funds raised (Shelly, 1997). 
The remaining $442-$474 million dollars would be used to expand the size of Pittsburgh’s 
Convention Center, improve the downtown area and build roads and other infrastructural 
amenities in the ten counties (Ibid.). The franchise owners’ support for the Regional Renaissance 
Initiative led prospective voters to believe that most of the public funds raised would be used for 
stadium construction, when in fact the majority of the funding was earmarked for non-stadium 
purposes. 
By contrast, neither Cincinnati franchise ownership group proposed to commit any 
funding to the stadium construction projects. Bengals’ owner Mike Brown publicly offered to 
contribute “a minimum” of $25 million towards a new stadium in Cincinnati, but when pressed 
 44 
by local media he “refused to provide more specifics” with regards to his funding offer 
(Horstman, 1996, D). As previously noted, Brown ultimately did not contribute any funding to 
the stadium: Greenberg’s dataset shows that Paul Brown Stadium, the Cincinnati Bengals’ 
current stadium, was funded entirely by the public and the revenue derived from the Issue 1 sales 
tax increase (Greenberg, 1999). Brown’s promise of contributing the $25 million dollars towards 
the construction divided opinion among voters, as 44 percent of those polled by the Cincinnati 
Post considered the potential contribution to be “not enough,” compared with 42 percent that 
deemed it sufficient (Horstman, 1996, E). The Cincinnati voters supported the Issue 1 tax 
increase without a firm financial commitment from the franchise owners. Moreover, neither 
owner publicly campaigned for the passage of Issue 1. After the Reds’ owner Marge Schott 
skipped a pro-tax rally, the Cincinnati Post asked pro-tax campaign manager Jeff Berding if he 
knew the reason for her absence: “Well, uh…no. No, I don’t. We’d invited them” (Report, 
1996). Schott proved to be more evasive, stating that she could not comment because “I’m in the 
middle of stuff” (Ibid.).  
The lack of substantial public support from either team owner did not prevent the local media 
from framing Issue 1 as a stadium tax. The Issue 1 tax increase was designed to raise $50 million 
dollars per year, with $35 million dollars, or seventy percent of all funds raised, earmarked for 
two new stadiums (Horstman, 1996, B). After Issue 1 passed, the Cincinnati Post published an 
article titled: “A landslide victory for the stadium tax” (Horstman, 1996, F). Though more of a 
“stadium tax” than the Regional Renaissance Initiative, Issue 1 passed because the team owners 
were mostly disconnected from the campaign.  
 The respective results of the stadium tax cases in Pittsburgh and Cincinnati in the 1990s 
are indicative of trends in stadium financing plans and the legislative processes behind them. 
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Both of the tax votes have idiosyncrasies that complicate their use as reference cases while also 
echoing developments in the stadium tax process. The Pittsburgh case is unique in the political 
organization and support of the anti-tax campaign. The large majority of County Commissioners 
that expressed public disapproval of the proposed tax increases proved to be a stronger cue for 
voters than the support of a few powerful politicians. As previously mentioned, anti-tax 
campaigns are generally “poorly-organized and poorly funded,” yet the anti-tax campaign in 
Pittsburgh exuded political organization and stronger funding sources than most others (Noll and 
Zimbalist, 1997). A former politician chaired the Pittsburgh anti-tax campaign, while a local 
attorney created the Cincinnati campaign. The Regional Renaissance Initiative had little chance 
of electoral success because of its weak polling numbers in the lead-up to the referendum vote. 
The Pittsburgh Post Gazette reported that there was broad public disapproval for the tax, and that 
the tax referendum trailed by a twelve-point margin (O'Toole, 1997, B). The makeup of the 
taxes, however, exhibits the trend to tax the citizens in the area that will receive a new stadium. 
Both the Regional Renaissance Initiative and Issue 1 were sales tax increases in the surrounding 
counties and considered, but fared differently because of varying levels of public support from 
local political elites and corporate executives. 
 
Discussion of the Comparative Case Study: 
 The stadium battles in Pittsburgh and Cincinnati in the late 1990’s can be used as a rubric 
for success for those who seek to pass stadium tax referenda and offer public subsidies to 
privately operated professional sports franchises. Political elite evaluations of tax increases serve 
as valuable cues to voters about how their elected officials feel towards public subsidies of 
professional sports teams. Whether in opposition or support, the side with the most political 
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elites operates as the strongest cue for prospective voters – eighty-eight percent of the County 
Commissioners that would have been affected by the Regional Renaissance Initiative helped 
ensure electoral defeat for the Pittsburgh stadium tax, while there was no sizable political 
opposition to the Issue 1 tax increase in Cincinnati. The local politicians in Pittsburgh were able 
to oppose the stadium tax subsidies because there was no clear indication that the Steelers or 
Pirates would leave western Pennsylvania. Steelers’ owner Dan Rooney publicly stated that his 
intentions were to “keep this team in this region” rather than sell the franchise or seek relocation, 
prior to the referendum vote on the Regional Renaissance Initiative (Collier, 1997). As the 
Pittsburgh Steelers did little to threaten relocation to another city, the dissenting County 
Commissioners had no reason to support a potentially unpopular sales tax increase.  
By contrast, the Cincinnati professional sports owners appeared more willing to relocate 
from the area and were able to strong-arm the local Cincinnati politicians into a more lucrative 
stadium deal. The Cincinnati Post published a letter to the editor that warned that the Cincinnati 
Bengals would “move to Cleveland” in the event that Issue 1 did not pass its vote (LTE, 1996). 
Bengals’ owner Mike Brown took a more aggressive public stance by stating that the team had 
no “other options, no alternatives, no Plan B’s” to remain in Cincinnati if the Issue 1 tax did not 
pass in 1996 (Horstman, 1996 D). Brown’s insistence to leave if Hamilton County did not 
provide adequate funding for a new stadium forced political elites to support and campaign for 
the tax increase. Furthermore, Brown met with officials from Cleveland who “gently” appealed 
to him to relocate to Cleveland should Issue 1 fail its public vote (Ibid.). Brown’s decision to 
leverage the Bengals’ potential relocation from Cincinnati compelled the politicians of Ohio and 
Cincinnati to throw their support behind Issue 1 out of fear that Cincinnati would no longer be a 
reputable city.  
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Corporate executive financial support of the pro-tax campaigns in Pittsburgh and 
Cincinnati proved to be significant not because of the financial disparities between the 
opposition and support campaigns, but rather because of the size and sources of the donations. 
The Regional Renaissance Initiative received several six-figure contributions from large 
corporations and both the Pirates and Steelers, which led its opponents to label it a “stadium tax” 
because of its connection to “monied interests” and both of the franchises. The Issue 1 pro-tax 
campaign operated with a similarly strong financial advantage over the opposition, but received 
no donations that were larger than $35,000 and the majority of its contributions came from small 
donors. The Pittsburgh pro-tax campaign struggled to translate its financial advantage into 
electoral success because of the strength of its oppositional campaign. The anti-tax campaign in 
Pittsburgh had political organization and strong leadership from a former County Commissioner 
and a solid funding base from local billionaire Richard Mellon Scaife, heir to the Mellon fortune. 
Steelers’ owner Dan Rooney notes that the pro-tax campaign experienced tremendous 
“difficulty” to get their message across to voters because their opponents, notably Scaife, were 
giving “misinformation” about the Regional Renaissance Initiative (Collier, 1997). The presence 
of an organized information campaign from the anti-tax group hampered the electoral chances of 
the Pittsburgh sales tax increase.  
The Issue 1 Hamilton County sales tax increase fared better than the Regional 
Renaissance Initiative in Pittsburgh because it had no strong citizen-led opposition. The anti-tax 
group in Cincinnati lacked the structure and financial vitality of that in Pittsburgh. To evade the 
“monied interest” connection that would bog down the Pittsburgh pro-tax group, the Cincinnati 
tax supporters “aggressively” solicited small donations at their campaign rallies to blend with 
their larger corporate contributions (Horstman, 1996 C). Though the anti-tax campaign manager 
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considered the act a “transparent smokescreen”, the Cincinnati Post continued to give the pro-tax 
campaign favorable coverage for diversifying its donor base. As previously mentioned, the anti-
tax group in Cincinnati lacked the sense of organization and structure of its counterpart in 
Pittsburgh (Horstman, 1996, A). Additionally, the campaign appeared to act with fatalism toward 
the prospect that the Issue 1 tax would be voted down. The opposition campaign received no 
donation of more than $500 prior to the vote. Anti-tax campaign manager and local Cincinnati 
attorney Tim Mara laughed and told the Cincinnati Post that the “real small contributors” could 
be found at anti-tax campaign rallies (Ibid.). The lack of organizational structure and seeming 
indifference toward the Issue 1 sales tax vote by the opposition campaign in Cincinnati improved 
the electoral chances of the tax.  
Professional sports team owner support proved to diminish the electoral success of the 
tax increases, as the public connection between the Pittsburgh franchise owners and the taxes did 
little to aid the Regional Renaissance Initiative at the ballot box. Rooney’s insistence on 
remaining in the region and his public campaigning for the Regional Renaissance Initiative 
conveyed to prospective voters that the franchise did not require a large public subsidy to 
continue to play in Pittsburgh. Steelers’ head coach Bill Cowher told the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
that he found it difficult “to imagine Dan Rooney taking the team somewhere else” and that 
Rooney “is a Pittsburgh person” (Bouchette, 1997). The franchise gave little indication that they 
would leave the region, and thus forfeited a large amount of leverage in its negotiation to secure 
more public funds for a new stadium. Rooney’s public association with the Regional 
Renaissance Initiative through large financial contributions to the pro-tax campaign further 
damaged the tax’s electoral chances because it permitted the opposition group to frame any tax-
funded stadium subsidies as corporate welfare to the franchise. Anti-tax campaign manager and 
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former County Commissioner Larry Dunn argued that the financial contributions by both the 
Pittsburgh Pirates and Steelers served as a cue to voters and “proves” to voters that the Regional 
Renaissance Initiative was a “stadium tax” (Barnes, 1997). Financial support of the pro-tax 
campaign by the Pittsburgh franchise owners and their weak relocation attempts demonstrated to 
the public that both private entities were seeking stadium subsidies merely to fit their own 
preference and remain in western Pennsylvania.  
The franchise owners in Cincinnati adopted a less public stance regarding Issue 1 and 
their proposed stadium subsidies. As previously mentioned, Reds’ owner Marge Schott avoided 
pro-Issue 1 campaign events and remained evasive when prompted about her absence by the 
Cincinnati Post. Cincinnati Bengals’ owner Mike Brown acted in similar fashion, offering 
Cincinnati voters a loose commitment to contribute $25 million towards the construction of a 
new stadium for the Bengals in Cincinnati (Horstman, 1996, D). Yet when asked about his 
financing contribution further, Brown “refused to provide more specifics,” essentially indicating 
that the team may contribute to the stadium construction project only after Issue 1 had passed, 
the stadium’s main source of funding (Ibid.). Instead of contributing to the pro-tax campaign and 
publicly committing large sums of private money toward the stadium construction project, 
Brown and Schott remained mostly anonymous during the Issue 1 campaign. Brown, believing 
himself to be a potential “lightening rod” for negative press, “deliberately” made no public 
appearances to support the Issue 1 tax increase (Ibid.). Though Brown attributed his lack of 
public support for the measure because he did not possess the ability to be as “personable,” it is 
clear that his avoidance of public events aided the Issue 1 tax increase at the polls. 
 It is unclear, however, that voters will continue to play a large role in the process to 
contribute public funding towards professional stadium construction. The aftermath of the 
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Regional Renaissance Initiative’s defeat at the polls and the subsequent public funds that were 
awarded to both the Steelers and Pirates began a trend of non-electoral solutions to stadium 
financing. Immediately after the sales tax increase failed, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette published 
an article postulating what the “Plan B” would be to prevent the teams from leaving the region 
(O’Neill, 1997). Over the next several months, the Pittsburgh franchise owners engaged in a 
negotiation with Regional Renaissance Initiative backers Mayor Thomas Murphy, and County 
Commissioners Bob Cranmer and Mike Dawida about what the taxpayer would commit toward 
stadium subsidies. The owners and politicians agreed on a “Plan B” to finance new stadiums for 
the Steelers and Pirates – the owners would increase their financial contribution by $30 million, 
and a Regional Asset District board would provide an annual contribution “between $10 million 
to $13.4 million” toward the stadium construction (Editorial, 1998). The public’s financial 
contribution was not subject to a referendum vote, and the anti-tax campaigners played no role in 
the negotiation of the Plan B proposal. Despite the Regional Renaissance Initiative failing at the 
polls, both Pittsburgh franchises were able to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in public 
funding to build new stadiums. Pro-stadium subsidy politicians bypassed negative public opinion 
by reaching an accord with the owners and using existing tax revenue so as to avoid a citizen 
vote. 
The effects that these variables have on the electoral prospects of stadium tax referenda 
can be used to make predictions about future stadium votes. Political and corporate elites that 
wish to pass stadium tax referenda can simply look to the stadium battles in both Pittsburgh and 
Cincinnati to determine which course of action they should take to secure their ends. A unified 
coalition of politicians can influence a stadium tax vote because voters still use politicians as the 
chief indicators for how they should vote themselves. Local corporate executives who favor 
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stadium subsidies to keep or attract professional teams to their city can work in coordination to 
give large enough sums of money to the pro-tax campaigns and stay out of the public campaign 
for the taxes. Team owners that want the taxpayer to offset the costs of their proposed new 
stadiums can give loose financial commitments to stadium construction projects and not publicly 
stump for stadium tax increases to prevent oppositional groups from framing the increases as a 
means of corporate welfare for wealthy individuals.  
 Yet none of these prescriptions can adequately solve the issue of voter ignorance towards 
direct democratic processes like ballot referenda. Citizens are still dependent on politicians to tell 
them how to vote, and on expensive information campaigns that disseminate favorable content 
about whichever side pays for them. It will be interesting to see if referendum voters can increase 
their intelligence and awareness about ballot measures regarding stadium subsidies without the 
help of these elite actors. In recent years, there has been an uptick in the awareness and coverage 
of the negative effects of economic effects that public subsidies for professional stadiums have 
on the surrounding areas. To the point, many journalists consider Paul Brown Stadium, the 
Cincinnati Bengals’ stadium that was entirely funded by the Issue 1 tax increase, to be the “worst 
stadium deal ever” because of the disastrous economic effects that the tax increases have had on 
Hamilton County (Preston, 2016). Journalist Darrell Preston states that the Cincinnati stadiums 
have increased in their cost to the public over-time because of lagging sales tax collections and a 
decrease in the population of Hamilton County. The Cincinnati stadiums were paid for by taxes 
that derive funds from local citizens, and the overall economic and population decline in 
Hamilton County has drained the strength of the County’s funding source considerably (Ibid.). 
This financing problem becomes self-perpetuating, as the County must refinance its debts to pay 
for projects that have had their funding sources funneled off to pay for the stadiums.  
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The increase in the variety of media sources that voters can use to make ballot choices 
through the proliferation of the Internet over the past two decades makes current and future 
stadium cases ripe for comparison with pre-Internet stadium battles. If citizen voters are opposed 
to stadium tax referenda and have more ways to understand the negative economic effects of 
publicly financed sports franchises, how will they vote on future ballot referenda? How will local 
politicians who support stadium subsidies change their approach? Will the types of taxes that 
will pay for new stadiums change? To examine these potential ripples in the stadium 
development game, I will look at three ongoing and recent stadium-financing battles in San 
Diego, California, Arlington, Texas, and Las Vegas, Nevada. I selected these three current 
stadium cases because they involve both electoral and non-electoral solutions to approve the 
public’s share of the funding costs. All three cases involve teams that are threatening to relocate 
to receive a larger share of public dollars to finance their proposed stadium construction projects. 
All three cities vary in their population size and the number of large corporations that are 
headquartered within them (Census, 2016). These cities have a history of passing stadium 
subsidy referenda to pay for professional sports stadiums. Moreover, the teams in each of these 
cities play in stadiums of varying age: the Texas Rangers stadium in Arlington is under twenty 
years old (Greene, 2017), while the stadiums in San Diego and Oakland (the Oakland Raiders are 
attempting to relocate to Las Vegas) were built during the 1960s (McSwain, 2016). Each city is 
undergoing a stadium battle but the stadiums that would be replaced vary considerably in age 
and modern functionality.  
These cases differ from the relocation battles in Pittsburgh and Cincinnati, however, in 
the types of taxes that will pay for the public’s share of the construction costs. The proposed 
stadium tax measures in Arlington, San Diego, and Las Vegas transfer the burden from local 
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citizens to tourists, be it through hotel or rental car tax fees. I will draw my information of these 
cases from the largest circulated newspapers in these cities. I expect that public financing of 
stadiums in contemporary cases will involve a smaller percentage of public contribution to the 
stadium construction projects and that the taxing schemes will change to target tourists instead of 
current residents. By placing the financing burden on visiting citizens and not the local 
community, local pro-tax politicians can increase voter support for these initiatives by assuring 
prospective voters that they will not have to pay for the new stadiums. The increase in the 
number of financially viable cities that can host professional sports teams has launched a new 
“stadium boom” in the past decade, but increased public awareness of the negative economic 
effects of stadiums will serve to lessen the public’s percentage of the costs of stadium 
construction. I expect that the proposed tourism taxes in Arlington, San Diego, and Las Vegas 
will generate more voter support for stadium tax referenda and maintain the trend of publicly 
financing sports stadiums.  
 
Section III: 
Arlington Case-let: Political elite and minimal team owner support 
 The stadium boom of the 1990s has set the stage for a massive increase in the public 
share of the cost of future professional sports stadiums. Team owner leverage in stadium-
financing negotiations has benefitted from the growth of professional sports leagues. Noll and 
Zimbalist find that as the success of small-market teams has rapidly reduced the “size of a 
metropolitan area that can support a team,” it has created more financially viable cities that can 
host professional teams (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). This increase in the number of potential 
cities gives professional owners significant leverage when looking for new facilities; if their 
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current city’s government refuses to contribute a satisfactory amount of funds, owners can 
threaten to relocate to a more cooperative city. The growth of sports leagues into smaller cities 
diminishes the bargaining power of anti-tax groups to block stadium tax measures by increasing 
inter-city competition for professional stadiums. Cities in smaller markets are competing with 
other cities for the right to finance professional sports stadiums for already-wealthy owners 
Moreover, the rise in inflation over the past twenty years pushes stadium construction 
costs incrementally higher for any newer stadium that is to be built. Economist Raymond 
Keating estimates that there has been $5.2 billion in government subsidies for professional 
stadiums from 1989-99, and projects that the public will pay out $9 billion in 1999 “and the next 
several years” (Keating, 1999). Stadium construction costs have grown, which in turn has 
increased the public’s share of these costs. Keating further argues that stadiums built between 
1991-1997 added to the recipient franchise’s value between 70 and 156 percent across the major 
four American sports (Ibid.). Professional sports owners enjoy the positive economic effects of 
the “stadium-boom” of the 1990s, as the taxpayer’s portion of the costs continues to rise. The 
drive to create economic value for private owners through stadium subsidies comes at the 
expense of the local government that approves the public funds and its constituents. 
Professional sports stadiums built in the 1990s came at a significantly lower cost than 
those constructed in the succeeding decades, but involved a larger share of public funding. As 
noted earlier, Greenberg’s table of stadiums constructed during the 1990s finds that the average 
public contribution to stadium development projects constituted sixty percent of the funding 
(Greenberg, 1999). This trend of the public incurring a larger percentage of the stadium cost is 
no clearer than in Arlington, Texas. In 1991, the citizens of Arlington voted to approve seventy 
percent of the funding for a new stadium for the Texas Rangers to replace the aging Arlington 
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stadium. (Greene, 2017). The stadium, Globe Life Park, cost $191 million to build, with the local 
government providing $131 million (Ibid.). The public voted to keep the Texas Rangers in 
Arlington by financing a newer stadium for the team to maintain financial pace with other 
franchises that would receive new facilities during the 1990s “stadium boom,” such as the 
Pittsburgh Pirates and the Cincinnati Reds. The new stadium ensured that the Rangers would not 
leave Arlington until after their stadium lease expired in 2022. 
The geography of the city of Arlington and its surrounding areas, however, accelerated 
the pace to build a new stadium for the Texas Rangers. Arlington’s proximity to the Dallas puts 
it in close competition with the city for sports franchises and other entertainment outlets. After 
the completion of $1.3 billion AT&T Stadium, Cowboys’ owner Jerry Jones moved the team to 
Arlington from Dallas County for the first time in its history (Ibid.). Voters approved a half-cent 
sales tax increase, a two percent hotel occupancy tax, and a five percent car rental tax to pay for 
the Arlington’s $325 million portion of the stadium financing for AT&T Stadium (Ibid.). The 
citizens of Arlington demonstrated a willingness to assume a large public cost to lure the 
Cowboys away from Dallas County. The inter-city competition for professional sports teams 
between Arlington and Dallas resurfaced during the Major League Baseball (MLB) season of 
2016. Ray Davis, the owner of the Texas Rangers, held talks with Dallas officials in May about 
the possibility of relocating the team if Arlington citizens voted against extending the AT&T 
Stadium tax increases to pay for a new stadium for the Rangers (Roland, 2016). The Rangers’ 
ownership group claimed that though the stadium was only twenty-two years old, it needed to be 
replaced by a new stadium with a roof so that it could be air conditioned during Texas summers 
(Ibid.). The excessive heat of Texas and the nearness of a financially viable city in Dallas gave 
 56 
Davis and the Rangers the opportunity to demand a new stadium and permitted them to choose 
the city based on the potential public contribution to the construction costs. 
The threat of the Rangers leaving Arlington for Dallas in search of a new stadium rallied 
the local political elites of Arlington to propose a stadium subsidy to replace Globe Life Park. 
The proposed public cost of building the new baseball stadium in Arlington is capped at $500 
million, and the funding is drawn from the three taxes3 that were enacted to build AT&T 
Stadium, with Davis and the Rangers contributing $500 million to the project (Dickson, 2016). 
Arlington Mayor Jeff Williams used the meeting that Davis had with Dallas political officials in 
May as an opportunity to generate support for the series of tax increases that would give the 
Rangers a stadium subsidy to remain in Arlington. Immediately following the meeting between 
Davis and Dallas’ Mayor, Jeff Williams held a press conference to encourage the citizens of 
Arlington to show support for the Rangers by extending the existing taxes because other cities, 
specifically “one that starts with a D,” were courting Davis about a possible relocation (Madden 
and Dickson, 2016).  
The leading politicians in Arlington made a concerted effort to keep the Rangers from 
relocating to Dallas by demonstrating their unified support for the existing taxes. The Arlington 
City Council unanimously approved a “Master Agreement” that would redirect the AT&T 
Stadium taxes to pay for a new stadium for the Rangers subject to public approval by Arlington 
voters (Cadwallader, 2016, A). Vote Yes!, the Arlington pro-tax campaign, also functioned as a 
political action committee chaired by Mayor Williams, and its board included the entirety of the 
Arlington City Council and the County’s school board members (Cadwallader, 2016, C). The 
public unity of the Arlington politicians who endorsed the Texas Rangers stadium subsidy and 
                                                        
3 A half-cent sales tax increase, a two-percent hotel occupancy tax, and a five percent car rental tax 
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the complete lack of any political opposition improved the electoral chances of the tax extensions 
because of the cue that politicians provide referendum voters. 
 Corporate executive desire to keep the Rangers in Arlington played an important role in 
extending the taxes that would pay for a new stadium for the team. The pro-tax campaign in 
Arlington benefitted greatly from the large comparative spending power that it enjoyed over its 
opposition prior to the referendum vote. As I have mentioned earlier, the campaign that spends 
the most on advertising and controls the flow of information about a ballot proposition to 
prospective voters tends to have the advantage because of how little information is otherwise 
provided to the public (Brown and Paul, 1999). The pro-tax campaign “Vote Yes!” received $1.5 
million in total contributions, as compared to the anti-tax campaign “Citizens for a Better 
Arlington,” which managed to raise $8,000 (Cadwallader, 2016, B). The Arlington pro-tax 
organization operated with a 187.5:1 spending ratio over its opponent, and was able to make 
large advertisement expenditures to media consulting firms of up to $600,000. The 
advertisements projected that the proposed new baseball stadium would generate $77.5 million a 
year for the city of Arlington (Ibid.).  
The corporate-financed advertising campaign made economic appeals to the public to 
approve the stadium subsidies for the Rangers. Additionally, the businesses that stood to benefit 
the most from the construction of a new stadium offered financial support to the Vote Yes! 
campaign. Delaware North Companies Sportsservices Inc., the food vendor at AT&T Stadium 
and Globe Life Park in Arlington, contributed $250,000 to the campaign, and a stadium parking 
service firm from Houston contributed $60,000 (Ibid.). Arlington corporate elites increased the 
electoral chances of the stadium tax extensions by creating a large spending disparity between 
the two campaigns, and using that spending advantage to devise an advertising campaign that 
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touted the positive economic development that the new stadium would generate. The citizens of 
Arlington voted to extend the tax increases by a 60-40 margin in November (Baker and 
Cadwallader, 2016). 
Similar to the organization that had supported the Regional Renaissance Initiative in 
Pittsburgh, the Vote Yes! campaign had an overwhelming spending advantage over the anti-tax 
organization. As mentioned earlier, the pro-tax campaign in Pittsburgh raised $4 million and 
operated with a 160:1 spending ratio against the anti-tax campaign, and the pro-tax campaign in 
Arlington exceeded this spending ratio (O’ Toole, 1997, A). Vote Yes! succeeded where the 
Pittsburgh pro-tax campaign failed by avoiding a public connection to “monied interests.” 
Although Vote Yes! received several five-digit contributions, the Fort Worth Star Telegram 
noted that the campaign had received a plethora of contributions that ranged from $10-$250 and 
that those smaller contributions came from “mostly Arlington residents” (Ibid.). The Arlington 
pro-tax campaign received the majority of its funding from large corporate actors, but the local 
media framed them as a small-donor campaign. Moreover, Ray Davis and the Rangers offered 
less visible public support for a new stadium than did the Pittsburgh owners in the late nineteen-
nineties. Davis and the franchise, like both the Pirates and Steelers, made a six-figure 
contribution to the Vote Yes! campaign, but rarely made public comments about the vote or 
attended in any pro-tax campaign events (Ibid.). The Vote Yes! campaign operated with a greater 
spending advantage than the pro-tax campaign in Pittsburgh, but enjoyed the same “small-donor” 
framing that had aided the Cincinnati pro-tax campaign in 1996.  
The Texas Rangers’ search for a new stadium echoes trends that can be found in 
contemporary stadium financing deals. The 2016 subsidies for a Rangers’ stadium in Arlington 
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involved a smaller percentage of public funding4 than Globe Life Park, and a transfer of the costs 
from local citizens to visitors. Excluding the half-cent County sales tax increase, the majority of 
funding for the new stadium is derived from tourism taxes such as a hotel rental occupancy tax 
and rental car tax. One could cogently argue that the reduction of the percentage that the public 
would contribute to a new stadium and the shift of the taxes from local citizens to visitors 
increased voter support for the tax extensions. Two weeks prior to the stadium tax vote, Mayor 
Williams tried to build public support for the taxes by stating that “the Rangers and visitors are 
going to pay for 75 percent” of the new stadium (Cadwallader, 2016, A). Additionally, along 
with the extension of the existing taxes, the citizens of Arlington approved a ten percent ticket 
tax and a $3 parking tax fee to help defray the public cost of the stadium (Baker and 
Cadwallader, 2016). The taxes that will pay the public’s percentage of the Rangers’ new stadium 
were designed to shift the financial burden away from Arlington citizens to those that visit the 
city.  
The strong financials of the Arlington government perhaps increased citizen approval of 
the tax extensions to keep the Rangers in the city. Voters demonstrated larger support for an 
extension of the AT&T Stadium taxes because the County had, for the most part, paid off the 
thirty-year bonds it took out to build the Cowboys’ new stadium. Four months prior to the vote, 
the Fort Worth Star-Telegram reported that Tarrant County would have paid off the bond debt 
accrued for AT&T Stadium by 2021 (Cadwallader and Osborne, 2016). Arlington voters 
extended the existing stadium tax measures because they had yet to experience any serious 
financial restrictions from their previous public-private stadium financing deals. Furthermore, the 
media had a considerably lessened impact on convincing prospective voters against approving 
                                                        
4 71 percent of the funding for Globe Life Park, as previously mentioned, came from the city and local governments. 
The public’s contribution for a new stadium is capped at 50 percent.   
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the “tourist” taxes. The Star-Telegram published an economic study that argued that Arlington 
would lose out on $300 million in the admission and parking taxes, and that the Rangers’ control 
of stadium naming rights would cost the city $300 million (Cadwallader, 2016, A). Referendum 
voters gave more weight to the positive economic forecasting that was paid for by the pro-tax 
campaign than the negative economic reports that were published by the area’s largest circulated 
newspaper. Voters proved to be more swayed by the campaigning of Arlington’s local political 
elites and the city’s inherent competition with Dallas than the negative economic forecast, as a 
Star-Telegram poll published a month before the election showed the tax vote at a 42-42 tie 
(Baker and Cadwallader, 2016). Local citizens were less concerned with capturing further money 
from a tourist tax-funded stadium and more concerned with evading paying for a stadium tax 
out-of-pocket. Unified political elite endorsements and minimal public support for the taxes by 
the Rangers owner won out against impartial economic studies.  
 The drive to increase team financial value through new stadium construction is not 
unique to Major League Baseball, but rather common to all sports. Though the San Diego 
Chargers play in a different league than the Texas Rangers, the teams are alike in their quest for 
a publicly financed stadium. Both teams use the threat of nearby cities as leverage to secure 
public funds for new stadium projects. The San Diego Chargers will receive a stadium subsidy if 
the local politicians in San Diego exhibit unified public support for tourism tax measures and 
team owner Dean Spanos, like Rangers owner Ray Davis, has little involvement in the pro-tax 
campaign.  
 
San Diego Case-let: Political elite disapproval and maximal team owner support 
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 Growing revenues in professional sports prompts teams and owners to maximize their 
franchise value at all turns. Roger Noll finds that professional sports teams and leagues have 
demonstrated increased revenue growth in “attendance and broadcasting,” which in turn boosts 
the value of professional franchises (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). This increase in team revenues 
breeds further development, as Noll argues that the “novelty” of a new stadium can boost a 
franchise’s value by as much as thirty percent (Stevenson, 2016). As such, it is in the best 
interest of profit-maximizing owners to demand newer facilities as often as possible.  
The National Football League (NFL) is now currently experiencing increased relocation 
efforts by its members for the purposes of acquiring majority-publicly financed stadiums in order 
to increase team value. This increased monetization of the NFL and professional sports in 
general fuels the desire of the NFL to tap into the Los Angeles market and thus give team owners 
more leverage in their pushes for stadiums. The St. Louis Rams decision to relocate to Los 
Angeles stems from a nullified agreement between the St. Louis Convention and Visitors 
Commission and the Rams about which group should pay for renovations to the existing St. 
Louis football stadium (Hunn and Pistor, 2016). The San Diego Chargers and owner Dean 
Spanos had petitioned the city to upgrade the fifty-year old Qualcomm Stadium or help pay for a 
new one to keep the Chargers in San Diego (McSwain, 2016). Similarly, the Oakland Raiders 
and owner Mark Davis sought for an upgrade over their own fifty year old Oakland Coliseum 
(Group, 2016). The NFL granted the St. Louis Rams the right to relocate to Los Angeles in 
January of 2016, and gave the Chargers first priority to move to Los Angeles after they extended 
the franchise a one-year option to relocate (Hanzus, 2016).  
 The stadium construction dilemma in San Diego is linked with that of the Oakland 
Raiders ownership group and the city of Los Angeles. Though the Chargers had the first rights to 
 62 
relocate to Los Angeles, the NFL gave the Raiders the opportunity to relocate there should the 
Chargers decline to do so (Ibid.). As both teams play in aging stadiums and have done so for 
decades, the two teams proposed that they would combine to build a privately financed stadium 
in Carson, California, but the NFL rejected their offer. As the league blocked the franchises’ 
attempts to both relocate and build a stadium with little to no public funds, the Chargers began to 
work with the politicians in San Diego to craft a stadium-financing plan that would help offset 
potential construction costs and allow the teams to remain in the region.  
The Measure C tax proposed an increase of the local hotel tax from 12.5 percent to 16.5 
percent in order to pay for both a stadium in downtown San Diego, and a convention center 
annex. The NFL and the Chargers were to combine to pay $650 million in private financing to 
the complete a new stadium for the Chargers in San Diego (McSwain, 2016). Like the Regional 
Renaissance Initiative from the Pittsburgh case, not all of the funds raised would go toward 
stadium construction, and the team offered to contribute some amount of private funding to the 
project. Unlike the Pittsburgh tax increase, Measure C was designed to tax non-residents and 
instead transfer the public cost to tourists who traveled to San Diego to rent hotel rooms. San 
Diego Mayor Faulconer publicly endorsed Measure C on October 3rd, a month before the vote, 
saying “it is important to have professional sports that bring our community together” (Smolens, 
2016). Dean Spanos and the Chargers contributed $5 million dollars to pay for advertising time 
to promote the passage of Measure C (Garrick, 2016, B). I expect that Mayor Faulconer’s 
political support, the Chargers financial contribution to the pro-Measure C campaign and to the 
proposed stadium will increase the likelihood that Measure C passes in November of 2016.  
 The corporate-political alliance struck between Dean Spanos and Mayor Faulconer 
increased the electoral chances of Measure C. The combined support of the pro-tax campaign by 
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Spanos and Faulconer and the influence of the two elites attempted to convince the public of the 
importance of the Measure C tax increase to the city. The alternatives to Measure C, other than 
outright relocation, stood little chance against the financial might of the Chargers’ ownership 
group. Former City Councilman Carl DeMaio devised a stadium-financing plan that required 
fans and private investors to contribute any sum between $5,000 and $700,000 towards the 
stadium construction costs (Showley, 2016, June 23). A group of San Diego citizens proposed 
“Measure D,” which would raise the hotel tax from 12.5 percent to 15.5 percent and use the tax 
revenue to build a convention center annex and defray the cost of a majority-privately financed 
football stadium (Garrick, 2016, B).  
As previously stated, Brown and Paul find that there is more public support for 
referendums that have been sponsored by elected public officials than citizen-sponsored 
initiatives (Brown and Paul, 2002). Though prospective referendum voters created Measure D, 
there was more voter support for politically endorsed referendums than citizen-endorsed 
alternatives. Measure D received significantly fewer donations than the Spanos-Faulconer 
supported Measure C. The San Diego Union Tribune estimated that the “coalition of groups” that 
opposed Measure C had only raised $15,000 (Garrick, 2016, B). Supporters of the citizen-
sponsored Measure D complained that a $100,000 dollar radio advertisement purchase 
wrongfully stated that local taxpayers support Measure C and a publicly financed stadium for the 
Chargers (Garrick, 2016, October 18). The Measure C campaign received support from the 
highest-ranking local politician and massive funding contributions from the San Diego Chargers 
franchise, and tried to prevent the “monied interest” frame that the Regional Renaissance 
Initiative failed to escape by paying for radio ads that proclaimed that the campaign derived 
support from local taxpayers. I expect that the combined efforts of political and corporate elites 
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to generate positive public opinion for Measure C will increase its electoral chances in the 
November election.  
 However, Measure C, like the Regional Renaissance Initiative, did not pass the 
November vote because of local political opposition to the stadium tax that would pay for a new 
stadium for the Chargers. Though the tax increase received the support of the Mayor, an 
overwhelming majority of the San Diego City Council opposed the Measure publicly. The San 
Diego Union Tribune openly stated that the process for building a stadium, with any mix of 
public-private funding, would not be able to continue without the support of both the City 
Council members and the Mayor (Smolens, 2016). The City Council is given equal import as 
that of the more “familiar” city Mayor. Councilman David Alvarez publicly campaigned against 
any tax increase that would pay for a new stadium, and was a founding member of the “No 
Downtown Stadium – Jobs and Streets First!” movement in San Diego that was instrumental in 
building voter opposition to the tax measures (Ibid.). Other Council representatives Chris Cate 
and Chris Ward urged voters to vote against Measure C (Ibid.). Councilman Todd Gloria called 
Mayor Faulconer’s endorsement of Measure C a “non-binding gentlemen’s agreement” with the 
Chargers ownership group (Ibid.). Dean Spanos and the San Diego Chargers had little hope of 
winning over majority support from San Diego’s City Council members, which hurt the electoral 
chances of Measure C or any stadium tax measure that would keep the Chargers in San Diego. 
The fight for the proposed stadium among the city’s districts further divided the 
Council’s support. City Councilman Scott Sherman, whose district contains Qualcomm Stadium, 
spoke out against Measure C because the Chargers’ ownership group threatened to relocate to 
Carson, California with the Oakland Raiders (Ibid.). San Diegans voted down Measure C by a 
margin of 56-44 percent in November. Local political opposition stemming from district disputes 
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and animosity toward Dean Spanos for threatening to relocate proved more significant than did 
mayoral support or excessive team financial contribution to the stadium construction project.  
 Measure C also failed in its 2016 vote because of California’s strict referendum passage 
laws. As with the Pittsburgh case, a large spending advantage over the anti-tax organization and 
support from “familiar” politicians like the Mayor proved less significant to voters than local 
political opposition against a tax increase. Pluralistic political elite opinion on a ballot measure is 
a stronger voting cue than corporate elite support. The California law that requires a two-thirds 
majority by voters to pass any ballot proposition, citizen or politician-sponsored complicated 
Measure C’s chances at the ballot box (Garrick, 2016, C). Although Measure C never 
approached a majority, let alone a two-thirds majority, it still stood little chance of passing by 
such a wide margin.  
Furthermore, the impact of political elite support for Measure C was tainted because of 
Dean Spanos’ public connection to the stadium tax increases. The politicians who opposed a 
stadium subsidy used Mayor Faulconer’s “agreement” with Spanos and the Chargers’ ownership 
group as an indication that Spanos and the Chargers were receiving a lucrative stadium-financing 
deal. Representatives from the Chargers told the San Diego Union-Tribune that the team’s 
success in securing a stadium subsidy required the public support from Mayor Faulconer, but 
made no mention of the City Council (Garrick, 2016, B). The oppositional City Council 
criticized Faulconer’s involvement with Spanos and the team; Councilman David Alvarez 
considered Faulconer’s agreement with Spanos to be too lenient and that Measure C would be 
conceding “giveaway after giveaway” to Spanos (Garrick, 2016, A). Public association by pro-
tax politicians with the team owner can taint the influence of political elite support for a stadium 
subsidy. Arlington Mayor Jeff Williams received no such public backlash for supporting the 
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Arlington stadium subsidies because the Rangers’ owner played a minimal role in the campaign 
to extend the tax increases. Similarly, the Cincinnati politicians who created the Issue 1 tax 
received minimal criticism because of the absence of the Cincinnati franchise owners from the 
pro-tax campaign. Team owner over-involvement in the campaign to pass stadium subsidies can 
diminish the cue that supportive political elites provide for undecided voters, and hurt the 
electoral chances of stadium tax measures.  
These two modern stadium development cases support my hypotheses that political elite 
opposition to a stadium subsidy is significant and that public team owner support for stadium 
subsidies hurts the electoral chances of such ballot measures. Citizens in both the late 1990s and 
today are wary of affording rich owners tax benefits for new facilities but still align their vote 
choice with those of their elected officials. These hypotheses may be less applicable, however, to 
the Raiders Las Vegas relocation case, as it involves a non-electoral approval of public funding 
for new stadium construction. Political elite voting cues and politician support or disapproval of 
stadium tax referenda play has no effect on non-electoral solutions to stadium financing because 
citizens are not voting on the public contribution. Non-electoral means of approving public 
financing for professional stadiums are more reliant on local corporate executive support as the 
public’s contribution has already been approved. As I have previously mentioned, after the 
defeat of the Regional Renaissance Initiative at the polls, the pro-tax politicians bypassed a 
public vote and approved existing tax revenue to cover the public contribution towards new 
stadiums for the Pirates and Steelers (PPG Editorial, 1998). Stadium construction did not get 
underway, however, until after the private financing contribution had been settled between the 
two negotiating sides (Ibid.). As the Las Vegas stadium development case involves a non-
electoral means of guaranteeing public funds to the construction project, I expect that corporate 
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elite support and team owner contribution to the proposed stadium will have the largest impact 
on the Raiders relocation efforts. 
 
Oakland/Las Vegas Case-let: Corporate elite support of non-electoral processes 
 As the National Football League (NFL) gave Dean Spanos and the Chargers the first 
option to move to Los Angeles, the Oakland Raiders’ ownership group had to seek a different 
solution and a new city to court for a stadium subsidy. The NFL’s decision to allow only one of 
the two franchises the opportunity to relocate to Los Angeles reflects the league’s continued 
intent to not over-saturate the Los Angeles football market. An owner can move their franchise 
only if the league’s remaining owners convene and agree by a 75 percent majority vote to 
approve the relocation. In 1978, Al Davis, father of current owner Raiders’ owner Mark Davis, 
tried to relocate the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles after their lease had expired at the Oakland 
Coliseum. The owners voted nearly unanimously to prevent Davis from moving the Raiders, by a 
margin of 22-0, with five owners abstaining (Asher and Shapiro, 1982). Davis filed and won an 
anti-trust lawsuit against the NFL after Commissioner Pete Rozelle and other owners refused to 
grant Davis the right to move the Raiders to Los Angeles, as the Rams were playing in nearby 
Anaheim, California (Ibid.). This need to diversify cities within the league also drives further 
stadium development in other cities. Given the NFL’s reluctance to over-crowd any of its 
member teams, Mark Davis and the Raiders had to consider options other than Los Angeles for a 
relocation destination.  
 Like the Chargers, the NFL tried to incentivize the Raiders to remain in Oakland. In their 
decision to allow the Rams to return to Los Angeles in January of 2016, the league offered both 
the Chargers and the Raiders $100 million dollars toward new stadiums should the two teams 
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strike a deal with the local government and remain in their respective cities (Wickersham and 
Natta, 2016). Unlike the Chargers, Davis and the Raiders made it clear that they would not even 
try to build a new stadium in Oakland. Davis worked on relocating the team to Las Vegas for 
much of 2016, and even applied to have the phrase “Las Vegas Raiders” trademarked by August 
of that year (Youmans, 2016, A).  During the fall of 2016, Oakland Mayor Libby Schaaf 
coordinated with an ownership group led by former NFL player Ronnie Lott to devise a funding 
strategy for a new football stadium in Oakland. Schaaf’s proposed stadium in Oakland is 
projected to cost $1.3 billion dollars, $200 million of which would come from the taxpayer, 
while the rest would be financed by several private actors,5 yet Davis and the Raiders were not 
part of the negotiations (Youmans, 2016, C). Following the report on Schaaf’s funding 
framework, Davis announced that he has not been “swayed” by Oakland’s plan and “remains 
committed to Las Vegas” (Youmans, 2016, B). Additionally, the NFL is reluctant to consider 
Schaaf’s proposal, as league Commissioner Roger Goodell wrote a letter to Mayor Schaaf and 
stated that the NFL and Schaaf “had not identified a viable solution” to keep the Raiders in 
Oakland (Gotz, 2017). 
 Davis’ Las Vegas alternative to building a new stadium in the Bay Area draws questions 
about the NFL’s focus on profitability and desire to expand into untested markets. The relocation 
of the Chargers and Rams to Los Angeles, however disruptive to the fan bases in San Diego and 
St. Louis, are relatively safe bets financially for the NFL. Los Angeles is the second largest 
media market in the United States, and the NFL has had teams play in Los Angeles from 1946-
1994 (Census, 2017). The Raiders’ potential move away from the sixth largest media market in 
Oakland to the nation’s fortieth largest in Las Vegas is, however, less financially defensible 
                                                        
5 $200 million would come from the NFL, $300 million from the Raiders and $600 million from Ronnie Lott’s 
ownership group 
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(Ibid.). Commissioner Goodell stated that the Las Vegas market has “real strengths” and is 
showing signs of economic growth due to increased tourism (Graney, 2016, B). Nevada’s 
economic reliance on tourism and outside visitors supports the trend of stadium taxes that shift 
the financial burden from local taxpayers to tourists. As mentioned earlier, Measure C in San 
Diego proposed to raise hotel room rental taxes four percentage points, up from twelve and a half 
to sixteen and a half percent (McSwain, 2016). The Las Vegas stadium-financing plan called for 
a .88 percent tax rate on all hotel room rentals in the “primary gaming corridor” of Southern 
Nevada (Senate Bill, 2016). This .88 percent tax rate increase will cover the taxpayer’s $750 
million dollar commitment to the proposed $1.9 billion dollar cost of the new football stadium, 
with Davis and the Raiders contributing $500 million dollars and Sands Corp. CEO Sheldon 
Adelson contributing $650 million dollars (Velotta, 2016, A). The $750 million taxpayer 
contribution is the largest amount of public funding to pay for a professional sports stadium 
(Graney, 2016, A). Instead of staying in Oakland and charging the taxpayer only $200 million in 
construction costs, Davis decided to push for relocation to Las Vegas at the public’s expense of 
$750 million and the potential partnership with a rich corporate actor.   
 Unlike the previous contemporary case-lets, the Las Vegas financing bill did not require a 
public vote. The Nevada State Assembly and Senate, not the taxpayer, voted on the decision to 
raise the hotel room tax rate to pay the requisite $750 million dollars for the stadium. Nevada 
Governor Brian Sandoval created the “Southern Nevada Tourism Infrastructure Committee” in 
2015 to “prioritize tourism improvement projects” in Nevada and compile a report and 
recommendation for action to the Governor by September of 2016 (SNTIC, 2016). The 
Committee suggested that the Nevada state legislature pass Senate Bill 1, which proposed the .88 
percent tax increase on hotel rooms to pay for $1.9 billion dollar Raiders stadium and a separate 
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.5 percent tax increase on other lodging accommodations to pay for $1.4 billion dollar 
construction of a convention center (Senate Bill, 2016). Sandoval’s endorsement of the Southern 
Nevada Tourism Infrastructure Committee’s recommendation to pass Senate Bill 1 indicated 
political elite support in favor of the stadium tax. Sandoval called a special session for the 
Nevada legislature to vote on Senate Bill 1, and the tax passed by overwhelming majorities in the 
Assembly and the state Senate (Whaley and Chereb, 2016, B). Prior to calling the special 
session, Sandoval began to build support from local politicians in Clark County by talking with 
the County Commission chairman Steve Sisolak,6 the county sheriff, and “gaming and labor 
leaders” from the county (Whaley and Chereb, 2016, A). Sandoval’s public approval of Senate 
Bill 1 allowed him to muscle the tax through the state legislature, and his effort to build support 
for the bill among leaders of Clark County further increased its chances of being implemented. 
The Clark County Commission voted in favor of the Senate Bill 1 hotel taxes by a margin of 6-1 
to secure the public financing portion of the Raiders’ proposed Las Vegas stadium (Davidson, 
2016). The political alliance among the Governor, state legislature and local Clark County 
officials was essential in passing Senate Bill 1 and assuring the Raiders that Nevada taxpayers 
would contribute to the proposed stadium. 
 Though there exists a political majority that supported the passage of Senate Bill 1 and 
the lack of public vote on the issue, the Raiders’ potential relocation effort remains dependent on 
the support of corporate elites in Nevada. As stated earlier in the introduction, corporate elite 
actors that support professional stadium subsidies generally exert their financial influence by 
contributing large sums of money to the pro-tax campaigns to control the flow of information to 
the prospective voters (Fort, 1997). These information campaigns serve to convince undecided 
voters to vote in favor of the tax increases. As Senate Bill 1 was not subject to a public vote via 
                                                        
6 Sisolak also sat on the Southern Nevada Tourism Infrastructure Committee 
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referendum but rather a vote in the state Assembly and Senate, Las Vegas corporate elites could 
not spend money to run information campaigns that would increase the electoral chances of 
Senate Bill 1. Yet the unique nature of financing plan that would pay for the Raiders’ stadium in 
Las Vegas hinged on corporate financial support. $650 million of the projected $1.9 billion 
stadium construction cost is to be paid by Sheldon Adelson, head of the Las Vegas Sands 
Corporation (Garrick, 2016, B). In addition, the politicians that supported and passed Senate Bill 
1 must deal explicitly with other Las Vegas corporate actors.  
Senate Bill 1 mandated the creation of a nine-person “Stadium Authority Board” that will 
essentially oversee the collection of public funds for the project and payment to the contractors 
that will build the stadium, three of whom will be appointed by the Clark County Commission 
and three appointed by Governor Sandoval (Whaley and Chereb, 2016, B). The bill required that 
the Clark County Commission appoint “at least one” of the nominees from the Caesars 
Entertainment Corporation and MGM Resorts International; the two groups that generate the 
most revenue from hotel rooms in Nevada (Jackson, 2016). The design of Senate Bill 1 
intrinsically tied political and corporate elites together to attract the Raiders to relocate to Las 
Vegas. The Clark County Commission nominated the president of MGM Resorts International to 
join the Stadium Authority Board, who had previously served on Sandoval’s Southern Nevada 
Tourism Infrastructure Committee, after Sandoval labeled hotels “Las Vegas’ foundational 
industry” (Chereb, 2016). Senate Bill 1 created the requirement for corporate elite support to 
ease the Raiders’ relocation efforts through the Stadium Authority Board’s employment of 
hoteliers and Adelson’s proposed $650 million dollar contribution to the stadium. The passage of 
Senate Bill 1 and the approval of public financing were not subject to the interests of corporate 
elite actors, but the Raiders’ relocation remains entirely dependent on corporate elite support. 
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 Despite the passage of Senate Bill 1 and the guarantee of $750 million dollars in public 
financing for a new stadium in Las Vegas, the Raiders’ relocation efforts are in danger. The 
franchise is reliant on a private financing contribution to the new Las Vegas stadium. After 
several months of negotiating with Davis and the Raiders, Sheldon Adelson pulled out of his 
$650 million dollar commitment to the proposed Las Vegas stadium, with a reporter from the 
Las Vegas Review-Journal stating that the $650 million “won’t come from the Adelson family” 
(Velotta, 2017, B). Davis’ contingency plan for another private financier of the stadium fell 
through days later after the investment firm Goldman Sachs withdrew its potential support, 
stating that the firm would only contribute the funds if Adelson was still involved given its long-
standing relationship with his family (Graney, 2017). These two major financing defections came 
just two weeks after the franchise formally filed to relocate to Las Vegas with the NFL 
(Gutierrez, 2017). Though they have made no public stance, it is unlikely that the NFL owners 
will vote to allow the Raiders to relocate to Las Vegas without knowing from where a large 
portion of the stadium funding will come. The threat of large corporate elites pulling their 
financial commitment to the Raiders’ proposed Las Vegas stadium jeopardizes any relocation 
efforts undertaken by the franchise. 
 The Raiders’ relocation to Las Vegas is entirely unique from any other case examined 
here. The political dynamic of Las Vegas and the Adelson family’s role in the relocation make 
the franchise’s efforts more complex. The Clark County Commission appears to make 
expenditure decisions almost entirely contingent on potential financial return. Following the 
passage of Senate Bill 1, the Clark County Commission voted to extend the Las Vegas Monorail 
from the MGM Grand hotel to the Mandalay Bay hotel. Clark County Commissioner Mary Beth 
Scow pushed for the monorail to extend to the Las Vegas airport, arguing, “it just seems so 
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logical” (Davidson, 2016). Clark County voted to extend a form of public transportation to create 
more economic benefit for the hotels along its route, but not to provide public transportation to 
its own airport. Moreover, the corporate elite support and private financial contribution for the 
Raiders’ new stadium remains blocked by the Adelson family’s position. Adelson’s relinquishing 
of financial support for the stadium means that the discussions between the Raiders and the 
Sands Corporation are a negotiation. After publicly pulling his $650 million dollars from the 
stadium construction project, the Adelson family stated that their “ultimate goal” is to get a 
professional football stadium built in Las Vegas, irrespective of his potential investment 
(Saraceno, 2017, A). The Adelson family also controls the largest circulated newspaper in 
Nevada, and each article that makes any mention of Adelson ends with “The Review-Journal is 
owned by the family of Las Vegas Sands Corp. Chairman and CEO Sheldon Adelson” (Velotta, 
2017, B). The Adelson family appears to remain interested in luring an NFL franchise to Las 
Vegas, and their public withdrawal of the $650 million dollar financial commitment can be 
viewed as a form of posturing in a public negotiation with the Raiders. Adelson’s complete 
control of the largest media outlet in the state and Las Vegas’ drive to create economic value 
from any and all government works project creates an environment that is receptive to a stadium 
subsidy. A $750 million dollar government expenditure hangs in the balance of a negotiation 
between two billionaires.  
 The near completion of the Raiders relocation from Oakland to Las Vegas supports my 
claim that corporate elite support is the most significant indicator in the non-electoral approval of 
government funding for professional sports stadiums. The NFL’s decision to delay the owner’s 
relocation vote until after a private financier agreed to commit $650 million to the construction 
project gives power to corporate elite executives in the stadium development game. A month 
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after Adelson and Goldman Sachs pulled their financial commitment to the proposed Las Vegas 
football stadium, Bank of America offered to pay the $650 million private contribution in the 
form of a loan, which includes no “equity stake in the team or the stadium” (Saraceno, 2017, B).  
The NFL preferred that the private financing contribution to the Las Vegas stadium have no 
involvement with the team or stadium whatsoever, and Bank of America has a history of 
conducting business with the league (Ibid.). Bank of America’s proposed financing contribution 
prompted Commissioner Goodell to state that the Raiders relocation vote would be a “positive 
vote” for the league, thus indicating that the bank’s investment in the stadium sped up the 
process of relocation for the franchise (Kaplan, 2017). Moreover, the fact that Bank of America 
has no financial stake in either the team or stadium indicates what the league values in a private 
financier – for their support to be purely financial and have minimal involvement in the future 
economics of the stadium. The private financing contribution of Bank of America to the 
proposed Las Vegas football stadium makes the bank both a stakeholder and bystander in the 
stadium development game. The NFL wants secure and reputable private financing sources, but 
for those financing sources to have little designs on profiting from the league. 
 
 
 
 
 
Section IV: 
Conclusion:  
Citizens are put in a precarious position when they are called upon to vote to approve 
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stadium subsidies for professional sports teams. They tend to know little about the ballot 
measure in the lead-up to the vote, and lack their traditional sources of information from political 
parties and partisan campaigns. As such, direct democratic processes are susceptible to the 
interests of groups who can provide voter cues to citizens. These powerful interests tend to be 
local politicians who benefit from having a “major-league” city, and corporate executives and 
businesses such as media outlets that will profit from having a professional sports team in their 
city, be it through construction contracts or the content that the teams create for the media to 
cover.  
Team owners prove to be less significant indicators of a ballot proposition’s success, as 
political scientists Delaney and Eckstein argue that ownership groups are only “marginally 
involved” in ballot proposition votes as compared to other corporate elite actors (Delaney and 
Eckstein, 2007). This can be seen most vividly in the comparative successes of Measure C in San 
Diego and the extension of the Arlington stadium taxes. Rangers owner Ray Davis did little to 
publicly campaign for the tax increases and received a stadium subsidy, while Dean Spanos’ 
connection to San Diego Mayor Faulconer hampered the electoral success of Measure C at the 
ballot box. Team owners have thus become the main scapegoats in the process of approving 
public funds for stadiums. They demand public funding to help complete new facilities and 
threaten to relocate if they are not satisfied with the public’s potential contribution.  
 This owner blaming is somewhat misguided, however, as team owners play no part in 
creating the taxing schemes that are used to fund stadiums and play a minimal role in 
campaigning for them. Local political and corporate elites who support publicly financed 
stadiums play a more critical role in assuring that these ballot measures pass. The political-
corporate coordination to create structurally sophisticated pro-tax campaigns that are geared 
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towards framing the stadium subsidy as a positive for the surrounding area and city has the 
largest impact on the electoral success of stadium tax referenda. By operating with a financial 
monopoly on the advertisements and other sources of information that referendum voters rely on 
to make their voting choices, the pro-tax campaigns are essentially assuring an electoral victory 
for stadium taxes. Politician support for stadium subsidies serves as an initial cue to voters to 
approve stadium subsidies, while corporately financed pro-tax advertisements bombard 
uninformed voters with selectively positive information about the impact that a publicly financed 
stadium will have on the region. 
Political and corporate elites who support stadium subsidies have failed to deliver the 
positive economic and budgetary effects on local governments because there are few. Yet these 
elite actors tend to receive the least blame by the press and citizens. To the point, Preston’s 
article on the disastrous effect that the Cincinnati Bengals’ stadium has had on Hamilton County 
makes no mention of the politicians who created the Issue 1 tax (Preston, 2016). After Measure 
C failed in San Diego and the Chargers opted to relocate to Los Angeles, the San Diego Union 
Tribune postulated that Spanos may have decided to take the Chargers out of San Diego because 
he is a “famous holder of grudges” and that he is a “coward,” but the paper did little to attack 
Mayor Faulconer’s pro-stadium tax position (Acee, 2017). These personal attacks against 
ownership groups may provide some solace for jilted stadium referendum voters, but fail to 
properly place blame on the important stakeholders. Political and corporate elites exert more 
influence on stadium tax referenda than do owners because they control the taxing strategies that 
will pay for new stadiums. 
 The economic effects of stadiums are widely overestimated and rarely bring beneficial 
financial impacts to the surrounding area and city. The appeals that publicly financed stadiums 
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will create local economic development are generally unfounded. Noll notes that those who 
support stadium subsidies for professional sports teams do so based on the notion that having a 
professional sports team creates “economic growth as well as consumption benefits” that warrant 
the public’s contribution to stadium construction (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). Professional sports 
stadiums are supposed to create more jobs in the regions that they are built and stimulate 
economic growth. Economists Robert A. Baade and Allen Sanderson state that though 
professional sports stadiums do create jobs, ninety-eight percent of those created are purely 
nonmanufacturing jobs and can be categorized as “trade” or “service” (Baade and Sanderson, 
1997). The jobs that professional sports stadiums create do little to increase the economic 
conditions of the region because they tend to be seasonal trade jobs that work inside the 
stadiums. Additionally, the authors note that publicly funded professional sports stadiums have a 
smaller economic impact than similarly expensive public expenditures, such as the construction 
of an industrial park (Ibid.) The economic benefits that professional sports stadiums create do not 
justify the public cost of stadium subsidies. 
 Determining the economic effects of professional stadiums becomes complicated, 
however, by the “consumption benefits” that professional sports teams generate. Professional 
sports stadiums are not financially viable because of the jobs that they may create – a multi-
hundred million dollar government expenditure must create more than three thousand jobs to be 
a justifiable public cost. Economists Bruce Johnson, Peter Groothuis, and John Whitehead argue 
that local governments that approve public funds to finance professional stadium construction 
“justify” their budget allocation decisions by claiming that professional sports teams create 
“public goods” such as “local unity, fan loyalty, and civic pride” among the city’s inhabitants 
(Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead, 2001). The presence of having a professional sports 
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franchise in one’s city can create unique value to that city that other organizations or firms 
cannot otherwise provide. The nebulous value of these public consumption goods does little to 
demonstrate to a local government that it has spent its money wisely. The authors find that few 
economists have actually attempted to quantify the value of civic pride and fan loyalty (Ibid.). 
These public consumption goods thus become ammunition for pro-tax elites, particularly 
politicians, to build public support for stadium subsidies. Professional stadium subsidies make 
citizens pay for the right to be fans of a team and lovers of their own city. 
 Politicians and other pro-subsidy actors have altered taxing schemes so as to assuage 
citizen economic concern about publicly financed professional stadiums. As they cannot rely on 
the job creation justification for stadium construction, politicians instead seek to place the public 
financial burden out of the region. Noll and Zimbalist highlight that supporters of subsidies for 
professional sports stadiums point to the positive economic effects that increased tourism will 
have on a city that hosts a professional sports team (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). Having a 
professional sports team increases a city’s reputation, and this bolstered civic reputation creates 
more demand for visitors to come and spend money in the city. As such, many new taxing 
schemes used to pay for professional sports stadiums involve “tourism” taxes – the Arlington tax 
increases involved hotel rental room taxes and rental car taxes, while Measure C in San Diego 
utilized a four percent increase on the city’s hotel room tax, the Las Vegas Senate Bill 1 raised 
hotel room taxes by .88 percent. Pro-stadium tax groups can avoid arguments that demonstrate 
the negative economic impact of professional sports stadiums by taxing the stadium’s strongest 
form of revenue – tourists.  
The authors find these justifications to be made hastily, however, as sports-related 
tourism has declined as the number of teams has grown (Ibid.). The increase in the number of 
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professional sports teams drives down tourism revenue because professional teams are now 
commonplace in most American cities. Yet the increase in teams that cities can compete for 
increases the demand for local governments to contribute to the construction of new stadiums. 
As previously mentioned, the increase in the number of financially viable cities that can host 
professional sports teams feeds Phelps’ “stadium boom” (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). This 
increase in teams and cities thus serves to increase public expenditures into stadium construction 
and diminishes its main form of revenue, and more recently, its main form of tax revenue that 
will pay for construction. The growth of professional sports makes professional sports stadiums 
exceedingly less financially defensible and the rubric of shifting the economic burden of stadium 
construction to visitors through tourism taxes is not as financially favorable given the diminished 
importance of professional teams to cities.  
The public appears to have become more suspicious of stadium subsidies since the late 
1990s and the Pittsburgh and Cincinnati cases may demonstrate. The defeat of Measure C in San 
Diego indicates that voters will reject tourism taxes to pay for new stadiums, even if the taxes 
have little to no effect on residents. This change in the willingness of voters to disapprove of 
stadium subsidies may have come too late. Many of the ongoing stadium subsidy cases are 
decided by non-electoral means. The Las Vegas tax increases were not subject to public vote, but 
rather decided by elected state representatives and senators. The Atlanta Braves are moving into 
a new stadium in the spring of 2017, and the financing plan was deliberately created in secret, so 
as to avoid the potential backlash of Atlanta citizens against building a new stadium to replace 
one that is hardly twenty years old (Ley, 2014).  
Citizen voters are beginning to have even less influence in deciding whether or not their 
local governments should sponsor stadium construction. This is problematic, as stadium 
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construction costs continue to rise and the public’s contribution to these costs have yet to truly 
slow. Michael Jacobson, the CEO of the Arlington Chamber of Commerce, released a report that 
stated that the public’s share of the stadium costs was only “23 percent” of the entire cost 
(Cadwallader, R. 2016, A), but the Arlington public-private stadium financing deal capped 
taxpayer contribution to the stadium at fifty percent, and not the twenty-three that Jacobson had 
publicly touted. There is no greater public expenditure that is handed out so willingly to a group 
that needs it the least. 
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